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THE ORIGINS OF THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 
CARLI N. CONKLIN

 
ABSTRACT 
Scholars have long struggled to define the meaning of the phrase “the 
pursuit of happiness” in the Declaration of Independence. The most 
common understandings suggest either that the phrase is a direct 
substitution for John Locke’s conception of property or that the phrase is 
a rhetorical flourish that conveys no substantive meaning. Yet, property 
and the pursuit of happiness were listed as distinct—not synonymous—
rights in eighteenth-century writings. Furthermore, the very inclusion of 
“the pursuit of happiness” as one of only three unalienable rights 
enumerated in the Declaration suggests that the drafters must have meant 
something substantive when they included the phrase in the text. 
This Article seeks to define the meaning of “the pursuit of happiness” 
within its eighteenth-century legal context by exploring the placement and 
meaning of the phrase within two of the eighteenth century’s most 
important legal texts: William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England (1765–1769) and the Declaration of Independence (1776). 
Ultimately, this article concludes that “the pursuit of happiness”—which 
was understood to be both a public duty and a private right—evoked an 
Enlightenment understanding of the first principles of law by which the 
natural world is governed, the idea that those first principles were 
discoverable by humans, and the belief that to pursue a life lived in 
accordance with those principles was to pursue a life of virtue, with the 
end result of happiness, best defined in the Greek sense of eudaimonia or 
human flourishing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the 
Pursuit of Happiness . . . .” 
    —The Declaration of Independence, 1776 
From 1823 forward, the phrase “pursuit of happiness” from the 
Declaration of Independence appeared in ninety-four United States 
Supreme Court cases. The pursuit of happiness was used by litigants to 
argue for everything from the right to privacy to the right to pursue one’s 
chosen occupation, and it was invoked by the Court to uphold the same. 
The most recent edition of Black’s Law Dictionary cites to that case law as 
it defines the pursuit of happiness as the “constitutional right to pursue any 
lawful business or activity . . . that might yield the highest enjoyment, 
increase one’s prosperity, or allow the development of one’s faculties.”1 
While this definition reflects how the pursuit of happiness has been cited 
in Supreme Court case law from the 1820s forward, it does not tell us how 
the phrase was understood in its historical context.  
Historians have long struggled to define the pursuit of happiness as an 
unalienable right. Most accounts begin in 1690 with John Locke’s Two 
Treatises of Government.
2
 In The Second Treatise, Locke lists the natural 
rights of “life, liberty, and estate,” with “estate” being what we today 
would call “property.”3 In 1776, in the Declaration of Independence, 
Thomas Jefferson lists the unalienable rights of “life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness.”4 Locke’s work was widely popular among the 
 
 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 783 (9th ed. 2009). 
 2. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: IN THE FORMER, THE FALSE PRINCIPLES 
AND FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER, AND HIS FOLLOWERS, ARE DETECTED AND OVERTHROWN: 
THE LATTER, IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 
(new corrected ed., vol. V 1823) (1689).  
 3. Locke defined “property” in this narrower sense as that which man “mixed his labour with, 
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property” and, as will be discussed 
later, in the broader sense of man’s natural right to “life, liberty, and estate.” See JOHN LOCKE, THE 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, Chapter V: Of Property § 27, and Chapter VII: Of Political or 
Civil Society § 87, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 28, 53 (Paul E. Sigmund 
ed., 2005). 
 4. The Declaration of Independence. Unless stated otherwise, the text of the Declaration to 
which I will refer is the draft created by Thomas Jefferson and edited by the Continental Congress. It is 
included, with changes marked, in PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 235–41 (1997). The signed, parchment paper version, which is on 
display in the National Archives, varies only in capitalization and punctuation (such as “Life, Liberty, 
and the Pursuit of Happiness” instead of the original version’s “life, liberty & the pursuit of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Founders, in general, and with Jefferson, in particular.
5
 The traditional 
explanation for “pursuit of happiness” draws on these connections and 
holds that, when writing the Declaration, Jefferson deliberately mirrored 
Locke’s listing of unalienable rights, but with one exception: Jefferson 
omitted Locke’s unalienable right of property and included instead the 
unalienable right of “the pursuit of happiness.”  
From there, the historical accounts attempt to make sense of the 
reasons Jefferson would replace property with the pursuit of happiness. 
The most persistent explanation offered is that Jefferson was 
uncomfortable enough with slavery to want to avoid perpetuating a 
property ownership in slaves by including an unalienable right to property 
in the Declaration.
6
 Yet, even if this explanation is true, it is not complete. 
Jefferson’s discomfort with slavery may explain why he would omit 
property from Locke’s original listing, but does not explain why Jefferson 
would insert “pursuit of happiness” in its place. 
In attempting to explain the substitution, historians have taken two 
approaches. The first approach argues that the substitution has substantive 
meaning. Historians adopting this approach have argued that “pursuit of 
happiness” invokes a synonymous right to property;7 the happiness to be 
 
 
happiness”) and some spelling (such as “unalienable rights” instead of the original version’s 
“inalienable rights”) from the version approved by the Continental Congress. See CARL BECKER, THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 184–85 (1922). 
 5. Paul E. Sigmund, Preface to THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE xi, xxiv 
(Paul E. Sigmund ed., 2005). 
 6. William B. Scott argues that Jefferson likely “amended Locke’s phrase to the ‘pursuit of 
Happiness,’” as a result of Jefferson’s own “serious doubts concerning the moral justification of 
certain forms of property.” Scott suggests that Jefferson inserted pursuit of happiness “in an effort to 
restore the old moral content to the concept of individual property. . . .” Scott is summarizing 
Jefferson’s concerns about newer forms of property ownership, generally, in contrast to Locke’s 
“‘natural property.’” WILLIAM B. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF 
PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 41–42 (1977). In 1775, Jefferson 
wrote against Great Britain’s treatment of the colonists, a treatment that he compared to enslavement, 
and expressed incredulity that “the divine Author of our existence intended a part of the human race to 
hold an absolute property in, and an unbounded power over others . . . .” A DECLARATION BY THE 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED COLONIES OF NORTH-AMERICA, NOW MET IN CONGRESS AT 
PHILADELPHIA, SETTING FORTH THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF THEIR TAKING UP ARMS (1775), 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/arms.asp (last visited May 4, 2015). For a 
vigorous argument that Jefferson’s concerns about property ownership did not extend to property 
ownership in slaves and that rhetoric such as that quoted above was for political purposes only, see 
Paul Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery: “Treason Against the Hopes of the World”, in JEFFERSONIAN 
LEGACIES 181 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993). For a contrasting discussion of Jefferson’s views on slavery, 
see Lucia C. Stanton, “Those Who Labor For My Happiness”: Thomas Jefferson and His Slaves, in 
JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 147 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993). 
 7. William B. Scott suggests that Jefferson intended to emphasize “Locke’s idealized ‘natural 
property.’” SCOTT, supra note 6, at 41–42.  
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found in the acquisition of material comfort;
8
 the happiness to be found in 
family life;
9
 or the Scottish Enlightenment idea of public virtue.
10
 But each 
of these definitions has its difficulties. The first two definitions articulate 
various forms of property ownership, but eighteenth-century rights 
theorists articulated “property” and the “pursuit of happiness” as distinct—
not synonymous—rights.11 The third definition of happiness as family life 
was a concept that did not develop until the nineteenth century, making its 
application to the Declaration anachronistic. Finally, the idea of happiness 
as public virtue, while more in keeping with eighteenth-century 
understandings of happiness, omits the placement of the phrase in the 
Declaration not as a public duty, but as an individual and unalienable 
right. 
The second, and more common, approach to defining the pursuit of 
happiness has been to conclude that it is a substitution for property that has 
no substantive meaning—or, at least, not one that is presently discernable. 
This understanding is best articulated by historian Carl Becker’s 
description of the phrase as a “glittering generality;”12 it sounds pretty and 
appealing, but it is either too general or too individualized to have any 
practical, substantive meaning. This line of thinking suggests that Thomas 
Jefferson inserted the pursuit of happiness into the Declaration not in an 
attempt to list any substantive unalienable right, but instead as an 
instrument of rhetoric, and it is as an instrument of rhetoric that the phrase 
does its work. It adds rhythm and beauty to Jefferson’s listing of 
unalienable rights, and if the pursuit of happiness does anything more in 
the Declaration, it is only to add a sense of undefined idealism to the 
listing of unalienable rights the Declaration contains.  
The pursuit of happiness as a glittering generality is the definition that 
has most taken hold, and it makes sense within a common twenty-first 
century understanding of happiness as “feeling good.” Within this context, 
the unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness suggests a potentially 
 
 
 8. JOHN E. CROWLEY, THE INVENTION OF COMFORT: SENSIBILITIES & DESIGN IN EARLY 
MODERN BRITAIN & EARLY AMERICA 200 (2001). 
 9. See generally JAN LEWIS, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: FAMILY AND VALUES IN JEFFERSON’S 
VIRGINIA (1983). Lewis also argues that this understanding of the pursuit of happiness did not develop 
until the nineteenth century and would be anachronistic if applied to the Declaration. 
 10. See generally GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE (1978). 
 11. For example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which Jefferson had with him as he drafted 
the Declaration of Independence, lists the inherent rights of “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the 
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” See 
the full text at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/virginia.asp (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 12. BECKER, supra note 4, at 201–02. See also MAIER, supra note 4, at 125.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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unmitigated right to pursue that which would make one feel good. But this 
understanding is at odds with what we know of Jefferson as a meticulous 
and deliberate writer and proponent of the rights and duties of man. Why 
would Jefferson include a phrase as glib, and as seemingly overly 
generalized, as the pursuit of happiness in a document that was, in all other 
respects, a serious and quite particular declaration of man’s natural and 
political rights?  
This question becomes more complex when examined in connection 
with the introductory portion of William Blackstone’s, Commentaries on 
the Laws of England.
13
 In Part I of his Introduction, Blackstone argues that 
the law of nature, and of nature’s God, contain the fundamental principles 
by which the entire natural world—including animals and humans—is to 
be governed.
14
 Next, he argues that the pursuit of happiness is the primary 
method by which men can know and then apply the law of nature as it 
pertains to humans:
15
 men can readily “discover . . . what the law of nature 
directs in every circumstance of life; by considering, what method will 
tend the most effectually to our own substantial happiness.”16 Happiness in 
this sense is synonymous with the Greek concept of eudaimonia; it evokes 
a sense of well being or a state of flourishing that is the result of living a 
fit or virtuous life.
17
 Rather than being “fleeting or temporal,” such 
happiness is “real” and “substantial.”18 It is real in that it is “not fictitious; 
not imaginary; [but] true; genuine.”19 It is substantial in that it pertains to 
the substance or essence of what it means to be fully human.
20
 Thus, for 
Blackstone, to pursue happiness was to pursue a fit or rightly ordered life; 
one that was in harmony with the law of nature as it pertains to man.  
Knowing of Jefferson’s antipathy for Blackstone (Jefferson famously 
referred to Blackstone as a “honeyed” Tory and viewed Blackstone’s 
Commentaries as overly simplistic in comparison with the works of Lord 
 
 
 13. Unless stated otherwise, the version of Blackstone’s Commentaries utilized for this work is a 
reprint of the original, first edition that was published in Oxford from 1765–1769. See WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (William S. Hein & Co. 1992) (1765).  
 14. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 38–39, 42. 
 15. Id. at 38–43. 
 16. Id. at 41.  
 17. “Fit” refers to an ancient and medieval concept of “rightness” or being “rightly ordered.” In 
the manner used above, a human is to be “rightly ordered” to the law of God as it pertains to humans. 
In other words, man is to live in harmony with human nature.  
 18. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 41. 
 19. “Real” is a synonym for “substantial,” which is defined as “real; actually existing.” SAMUEL 
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1645 (1755), “real,” available at 
http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/ (last visited May 09, 2015) [hereinafter JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY]. 
 20. “Substance” is defined as “the essential part.” JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 
1972. “Essential” refers to the essential nature of a thing. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/6
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Coke),
21
 it does not seem, at first glance, that Jefferson would have shared 
Blackstone’s understanding of the pursuit of happiness when he included 
the phrase in the Declaration. Yet, the framing of the phrase in both works 
suggests otherwise. Blackstone’s discussion of the pursuit of happiness 
was both preceded by, and informed by, his discussion of the laws of 
nature and of nature’s God, a framing of the phrase that was mirrored in 
the Declaration.
22
 Furthermore, the weightiness of Blackstone’s definition 
of pursuit of happiness resonates with the weightiness of the Declaration 
as a text.  
This article seeks to determine the eighteenth-century legal meaning of 
the phrase “pursuit of happiness” by undertaking two parallel 
investigations. First, the article will investigate Blackstone’s use of the 
phrase “pursuit of happiness” and the work it performs in his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England. Second, the article will investigate 
Jefferson’s use of the phrase “pursuit of happiness” and the work it 
performs in the Declaration of Independence. Each investigation seeks to 
set aside twenty-first century understandings of “happiness” and “pursuit 
of happiness” and, instead, adopts an historical methodology that focuses 
on understanding historical actors and ideas in their own context.
23
 In fact, 
a close investigation of the pursuit of happiness in historical context 
suggests that, instead of being a mere substitution for Locke’s property or 
a glittering generality, the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration has a 
clear and distinct meaning, and it is the same meaning as outlined by 
Blackstone when he included a discussion and definition of the phrase in 
his Commentaries on the Laws of England.  
 
 
 21. Letter from Jefferson to Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 726 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944) (discussed in Gerald T. Dunne, 
American Blackstone, WASH. U. L.Q. 321, 326 (1963)). 
 22. See generally BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 38–43. Where the Declaration uses the phrase, 
“the laws of nature and of nature’s God” Blackstone uses, “the law of nature and the law of 
revelation,” which he later summarizes as “the law of nature, and the law of God.” BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 13, at 39, 42–43. The laws of nature refers to scientific laws that govern the natural world. 
See COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS, infra note 49. Cohen argues that this is distinct 
from the law (singular) of nature, which is the natural law, but Blackstone and the Founders seemed to 
view both the laws of nature and the laws of nature’s God as being part of (and a reflection of) the 
natural law. The “law of revelation” is the law of God as revealed through the Holy Scriptures. 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 42. 
 23. G. Edward White, Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
781, 819–20 (1999–2000). To that extent, this article focuses specifically on the legal meaning of the 
phrase “pursuit of happiness,” as understood by the authors of these texts. For a broad intellectual 
history of the idea of happiness in Western thought, see generally DARRIN M. MCMAHON, HAPPINESS: 
A HISTORY (2005). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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An investigation into the historical context of each document does not 
reveal a specific reference proving that Jefferson intended to evoke 
Blackstone’s understanding of the pursuit of happiness when he included 
the phrase in the Declaration. It does not reveal a reference to 
Blackstone’s pursuit of happiness in early drafts of the Declaration, in the 
edits that followed, or in Jefferson’s or John Adams’ later reflections on 
the text. Instead, this investigation reveals something even more 
compelling: each of the four key strands of thought that were prevalent at 
the Founding—English law and legal theory; the history and philosophy of 
Classical Antiquity; Christianity; and the Scottish Enlightenment’s focus 
on Newtonian Science—had, at their core, the same understanding of 
epistemology or ways of knowing that Blackstone voiced when he defined 
the pursuit of happiness in the introductory portion of his Commentaries. 
The pursuit of happiness, as used in both works, refers to man’s ability to 
know the law of nature and of nature’s God as it pertains to man, and 
man’s unalienable right to then choose to pursue a life of virtue or, in other 
words, a life lived in harmony with those natural law principles. The result 
would be eudaimonia or man’s own real and substantial happiness. 
This article will proceed in three parts. Part I will explore the pursuit of 
happiness as used by Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of 
England. First, it will outline Blackstone’s definition of the pursuit of 
happiness and the placement and purpose of the phrase in the 
Commentaries. Specifically, it will describe Blackstone’s inclusion of 
pursuit of happiness in his Commentaries as a science of jurisprudence by 
which his students could know and then rightly apply the first principles of 
the Common Law in their future work as lawyers, judges, jurors, or 
members of Parliament (“MPs”). Second, it will demonstrate that 
Blackstone was not alone in defining the pursuit of happiness in this way, 
but was simply articulating an understanding of the pursuit of happiness 
that was common among the Latitudinarian Anglican theologians and 
Scottish Common Sense philosophers of his day. Part I will conclude with 
an exploration of Blackstone’s goal of improving and perfecting the 
English Common Law and the emphasis he placed on the jurisprudence of 
the pursuit of happiness as a means to that end.  
Part II will explore the pursuit of happiness as it was used in the 
Declaration of Independence. First, it will describe the placement of the 
phrase in the Declaration and its lack of alteration throughout the drafting 
of that document. Second, it will explore the intellectual backdrop of the 
Declaration, with an emphasis on four key strands of thought that were 
prevalent during the Founding Era: English law and legal theory; the 
history and philosophy of Classical Antiquity; Christianity; and the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/6
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Scottish Enlightenment’s focus on Newtonian Science. It will explore the 
ways in which Jefferson, Adams, and Franklin—the drafters of the 
Declaration—intermingled these strands in their own political, natural, 
and moral philosophies. Next, it will demonstrate that the pursuit of 
happiness is defined at the place where the four strands converge, which is 
in an understanding of the natural world governed by first principles, most 
frequently described in the Founding Era as “fundamental principles” or 
“the laws of nature and of nature’s God.” Part II will conclude with a 
discussion of how Jefferson, Adams, and Franklin ultimately understood 
the pursuit of happiness within the Greek concept of eudaimonia, the well-
being or human flourishing that results from the pursuit of a virtuous or 
rightly ordered life.  
While Parts I and II provide evidence that Blackstone and the Founders 
understood the pursuit of happiness to have the same Enlightenment Era 
meaning, Part III will explore how that meaning had two distinct 
applications in the Commentaries and the Declaration. First, it will 
highlight Blackstone’s and the Founders’ shared definition of the pursuit 
of happiness. Second, it will explore their dual applications of the phrase 
as a private right and a public duty. It will begin by describing the private 
right use of the phrase, as exemplified by the Founders’ inclusion of the 
pursuit of happiness—the right to choose to live in harmony with the law 
of nature as it pertains to man—as one of the individual and unalienable 
rights listed in the Declaration. Then, it will discuss the public duty 
application of the phrase, exemplified by Blackstone’s belief that the 
pursuit of happiness as a science of jurisprudence would enable future 
lawyers, judges, jurors, and MPs to conduct their legal work in harmony 
with the first principles of the English Common Law—and his insistence 
that future lawmakers had a duty to determine and apply the law within 
that framework. Finally, it will explore the ways in which the private right 
and public duty applications of the pursuit of happiness were articulated 
not only in the Commentaries and the Declaration, but in other writings by 
Blackstone and the Founders as well. 
I. THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 
 . . . [God] has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven 
the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, 
that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if 
the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In 
consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of 
abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or 
unfitness of things, as some have vainly surmised; but has 
graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal 
precept, “that man should pursue his own happiness.” This is 
the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law.
24
  
—William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(1765–1769).  
A. Placement and Purpose: A New Science of Jurisprudence 
On October 25, 1758, what would later become the Introduction to 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England was read aloud at the 
beginning of the Vinerian lectures on English law at Oxford.
25
 As was 
made clear in his first Vinerian lecture, Blackstone had a vision for 
reforming English legal education. The key question that informed his task 
was the question of the knowledge and structure of the law itself. Was the 
English law, as Blackstone contemporary Sir William Jones asked in 
1781, “‘merely an unconnected series of decrees and ordinances,’” or was 
it “‘a Science’” that should “‘claim an exalted rank in the empire of reason 
. . . founded on principle’”?26 If the former, the English law was suitable 
for study in its particulars but perhaps had no larger significance. If the 
latter, then the English law should be viewed as an interrelated “‘great 
system of jurisprudence, like that of the Universe,’” which “had to consist 
‘of many subordinate systems,’ all ‘connected by nice links and beautiful 
dependencies’ and each ‘reducible to a few plain elements.’”27 In other 
words, if the English law was but a series of oral or written positive law 
pronouncements disconnected from any larger principles or underlying 
foundations, then the only thing that could be expected of English legal 
education was experience in the law through the apprenticeship system, 
which was already occurring at the Inns of Court.
28
 If, on the other hand, 
the English law was “a great system of jurisprudence” which had been 
 
 
 24. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 40–41 (emphasis added). 
 25. Id. at 3. This series of lectures provided the foundation for Blackstone’s four-volume work 
entitled, Commentaries on the Laws of England, which was published between 1765–1769. DAVID 
LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY BRITAIN 31 (1989). 
 26. LIEBERMAN, supra note 25, at 34.  
 27. Id. at 34. Lieberman is citing WILLIAM JONES, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 123 
(1781) and WYNNE, EUNOMUS, I, 6–7 and II, 52–7. 
 28. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 32. 
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built on a natural law foundation, and if the existing positive law had been 
formed on the basis of these larger principles, then English legal education 
ought to begin with the study of law as a science and a system. 
In his Commentaries, Blackstone argued well for the law as a science 
or body of knowledge governed by a system of interrelated principles: 
[Law is] a science, which distinguishes the criterions of right and 
wrong; which teaches to establish the one, and prevent, punish, or 
redress the other; which employs in it’s [sic] theory the noblest 
faculties of the soul, and exerts in it’s [sic] practice the cardinal 
virtues of the heart; a science, which is universal in it’s [sic] use and 
extent, accommodated to each individual, yet comprehending the 
whole community; that a science like this should have ever been 
deemed unnecessary to be studied in an [sic] university, is matter of 
astonishment and concern. Surely, if it were not before an object of 
academical knowledge, it was high time to make it one; and to those 
who can doubt the propriety of it’s [sic] reception among us (if any 
such there be) we may return an answer in their own way; that 
ethics are confessedly a branch of academical learning, and 
Aristotle himself has said, speaking of the laws of his own country, 
that jurisprudence or the knowledge of those laws is the principal 
and most perfect branch of ethics.
29
 
As seen in the passage above, the system of law envisioned by Blackstone 
was a system in the Latin sense of the word: a systema, or a “scheme 
which unites many things in order.”30 The Common Law, as it had 
developed over centuries, was, to Blackstone, an ordered assemblage of 
principles and doctrines.
31
 The several parts of the Common Law created 
one system, which then could be studied as a science. Blackstone lamented 
that the laws and constitution of England were not included in the general 
course of university study at Oxford and Cambridge, as the Roman Civil 
Code was on the Continent, and he sought to prompt his fellow 
Englishmen to obtain “a competent knowledge in that science, which is to 
be the guardian of his natural rights and the rule of his civil conduct.”32 
 
 
 29. Id. at 27 (italics in original). Blackstone’s use of italics in his reference to Aristotle suggests 
that he includes the philosopher’s argument as a way to address counterarguments by those who 
uphold Aristotle’s teachings, but would disagree with Blackstone on the study of law. It is a shrewd 
use of Aristotle, and a good demonstration of the fact that Blackstone disagreed with Aristotle’s 
methods, but not his overall purpose. 
 30. “System” in JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 2011. 
 31. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 13.  
 32. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 4.  
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Since such study was new to mid-eighteenth century English university 
students, Blackstone felt the burden of defending his position, and 
therefore wrote the Introduction to his Commentaries as an apologetic for 
the study of the English Common Law, the ramifications of neglecting 
such study, and the need to provide English law as a course of study for all 
English university students.
33
 He believed that “a competent knowledge” 
of the laws of England should be “the proper accomplishment of every 
gentleman and scholar.”34  
Blackstone’s emphasis on both the layperson and the aspiring lawyer 
understanding the law was instrumental to his ultimate goal of English law 
reform. Blackstone believed that all university students, not only aspiring 
lawyers who would later train at the Inns of Court, should have an 
acquaintance with the law, to the extent possible given their varying 
conditions, fortunes, and degrees of leisure.
35
 In an attempt to make a legal 
education compelling to university students who did not aspire to careers 
in law, Blackstone appealed to their interests. He stated that gentlemen 
should seek learning in the law in order to better understand the law of 
property (which governed their own concerns), to serve properly on a jury, 
and to carry out “legal and effectual justice” in the role of a magistrate.36 
He especially emphasized such education for future MPs. Parliament had 
the ability to pass statutes that would affirm, disaffirm, or alter the 
Common Law. Therefore, Blackstone ascribed to MPs especially a high 
sense of duty in improving and preserving the laws of England, describing 
their role as follows:  
They are the guardians of the English constitution; the makers, 
repealers [sic], and interpreters of the English laws; delegated to 
watch, to check, and to avert every dangerous innovation, to 
propose, to adopt, and to cherish any solid and well-weighed 
improvement; bound by every tie of nature, of honour, and of 
religion, to transmit that constitution and those laws to their 
posterity, amended if possible, at least without any derogation.
37
 
Blackstone also appealed to university students by laying a challenge 
before them. He argued that “the science of legislation” was “the noblest 
and most difficult of any” of the sciences, and that the Common Law of 
 
 
 33. Id. at 6. 
 34. Id. at 5–6. 
 35. Id. at 7–9. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 9. 
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England had suffered from “the defective education” of the English 
lawmakers: “it’s [sic] symmetry has been destroyed, it’s [sic] proportions 
distorted, and it’s [sic] majestic simplicity exchanged for specious 
embellishments and fantastic novelties.”38 In fact, Blackstone agreed with 
Sir Edward Coke that it was Parliament’s uneducated alterations to the 
Common Law that had led to “almost all the perplexed questions, almost 
all the niceties, intricacies, and delays” of the English Common Law 
system in the first place.
39
 Since the majority of MPs had attended 
Cambridge or Oxford in the mid-eighteenth century,
40
 it would be 
particularly effective for future MPs to be trained in law at the university 
level. 
If Blackstone was hard on the gentlemen who might one day serve as 
lawmakers in Parliament, he was even more so on the members of the 
nobility who might one day become judges. Blackstone believed that 
judges, more than MPs, had the power to guide the development of the 
Common Law, for good or for ill. The decisions of superior judges, 
Blackstone argued, were “final, decisive, irrevocable: no appeal, no 
correction, not even a review can be had . . . .”41 Blackstone believed the 
nobility had been granted entry into the position of judge because they 
alone had the means to obtain the education in law necessary for proper 
fulfillment of the judicial role.
42
 He did not mince words in his charge to 
the nobility regarding their duty to obtain a legal education, which would 
then enable them to judge rightly: “ignorance of the laws of the land hath 
ever been esteemed dishonourable, in those who are entrusted by their 
country to maintain, to administer, and to amend them.”43 Blackstone’s 
charge to his students shows how strongly he believed in his first means of 
law reform, which was the inclusion of an education in English Common 
Law at the university level. Blackstone’s second means of reform was to 
include in that education an instruction in a particularly English science of 
jurisprudence: the pursuit of happiness.  
 
 
 38. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 9–10. 
 39. Id. at 10–11. Lieberman has argued well for this guiding purpose behind the Commentaries. 
See LIEBERMAN, supra note 25, at 34.  
 40. ROBERT ANDERSON, BRITISH UNIVERSITIES PAST AND PRESENT 22 (2006). Anderson cites 
JOHN GASCOIGNE, CAMBRIDGE IN THE AGE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT: SCIENCE, RELIGION AND 
POLITICS FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 19 (1989); JOHN CANNON, 
ARISTOCRATIC CENTURY: THE PEERAGE OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 47 (1984); and THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, VI, NINETEENTH-CENTURY OXFORD, pt. 1 478–79 (M. G. 
Brock & M. C. Curthoys eds., 1997). 
 41. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 11. 
 42. Id. at 12. 
 43. Id. at 13. 
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When Blackstone began his law lectures, future lawyers had long been 
gaining experience with the body of English law in the existing 
apprenticeship system at the Inns of Court. Blackstone decried the way in 
which apprenticeship urged future lawyers to place practice before theory, 
and thus to begin “at the wrong end.”44 He expressed great concern for the 
future of a lawyer trained in this manner:  
[I]f he be uninstructed in the elements and first principles upon 
which the rule of practice is founded, the least variation from 
established precedents will totally distract and bewilder him: ita lex 
scripta est is the utmost his knowledge will arrive at; he must never 
aspire to form, and seldom expect to comprehend, any arguments 
drawn a priori, from the spirit of the laws and the natural 
foundations of justice.
45
  
To remedy this lack, Blackstone argued that a university level education in 
English jurisprudence—an education in how to know and apply the first 
principles of the law—must precede apprenticeship at the Inns of Court.  
Blackstone’s articulation of the pursuit of happiness as a science of 
jurisprudence was influenced by his belief that the English law was a 
coherent system based on fundamental principles that could be known by 
man. The fact that the law as it existed at the time of the Commentaries 
was, in some ways, out of sync with those fundamental principles, in no 
way invalidated either the existence of those principles or the natural 
coherency of the law. Neither did it preclude future lawmakers and judges 
from being able to rightly discern and apply those principles in the English 
Common Law system. Instead, the existing inconsistencies in the law 
provided support for Blackstone’s argument that the study of English law, 
as a system, needed to be coupled with an English science of 
jurisprudence. If errors and confusion had made their way into the English 
law, this was to be expected due both to the reception of the Roman civil 
and canon law and to the unnecessary complexity of the Scholastic method 
of jurisprudence that had prevailed in Roman law instruction in the 
English universities. Blackstone argued for a more simple science of 
jurisprudence, emphasizing that principles of law could be discovered 
even without “a chain of metaphysical disquisitions” or “the due exertion 
 
 
 44. Id. at 32. 
 45. Id. 
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of right reason.”46 That simpler science of jurisprudence was the pursuit of 
happiness: 
For [the Creator] has so intimately connected, so inseparably 
interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each 
individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the 
former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it can not but 
induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of 
justice and human felicity, He has not perplexed the law of nature 
with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring 
merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly 
surmised; but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this 
one paternal precept, “that man should pursue his own 
happiness.” This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural 
law.
47
  
In Book One of his Commentaries, Blackstone argued strongly for the 
pursuit of happiness as the primary method of English jurisprudence. He 
believed that, due to its simplicity, the pursuit of happiness was the best 
method of knowing the foundational principles from which man-made law 
could be deduced. Blackstone began his jurisprudential discussion with 
this definition of law: 
Law, in it’s [sic] most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a 
rule of action; and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, 
whether animate, or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus we say, 
the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well 
as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action, 
which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is 
bound to obey.
48
 
Sir Isaac Newton described these rules of action or principles that 
governed the natural world as “laws of nature”49 and Blackstone adopted 
this same phrasing in his Commentaries. Blackstone added to it the law of 
 
 
 46. Id. at 40. 
 47. Id. at 40–41 (emphasis added). Blackstone’s lectures were famously ridiculed by his former 
student, Jeremy Bentham, who advocated for a more utilitarian view of happiness. Interestingly 
enough, Bentham and John Lind later wrote a harshly worded rebuttal of the Declaration of 
Independence entitled, AN ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS (London 
1776).  
 48. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 38 (emphasis added). 
 49. I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS AND MADISON 114–121 (1995) [hereinafter SCIENCE 
AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS]. 
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revelation, with the understanding that the first principles or rules of action 
that governed the natural world could be revealed to man either as he 
studied the laws of nature revealed in the natural world or as he studied the 
Scripture revealed to man by nature’s God.50 Both phrases indicated first 
principles or laws by which the natural world is governed.
51
 According to 
Blackstone, “when the supreme being formed the universe, and created 
matter out of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, 
from which it can never depart, and without which it would cease to be.”52  
To Blackstone, this law of nature that governed plants, animals, and 
inanimate matter in the created world was no different from the law of 
nature that governed mankind. Man, just like the rest of creation, “must 
necessarily be subject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a 
dependent being.”53 Blackstone believed that, because man “depends 
absolutely upon his maker for every thing, it [was] necessary that he 
should in all points conform to his maker’s will,” which was summed up 
in “the law of nature.”54 Yet, at the same time, Blackstone clearly 
separated man from the rest of creation, based upon man’s unique, God-
given ability “to think” and “to will.”55 Blackstone believed that God gave 
man the ability to think and to will because He intended that man regulate 
his own behavior in accordance with the natural law; God wanted humans 
to use their “reason and freewill” to discern the “immutable laws of human 
nature, whereby [human] freewill is in some degree regulated and 
restrained.”56 Blackstone’s discussion here is fascinating because, by his 
very definition, he acknowledged an inherent and immutable limitation on 
human free will that he also saw reflected in the laws God set in place to 
govern the natural world. Just as God established “certain rules” to govern 
“the principle of mobility” in matter, so too did he establish “immutable 
laws” to govern human free will.57 In each case, the former “regulated and 
restrained” the latter. Thus, Blackstone’s view of human free will was not 
without limitation. Instead, it was the bounded freedom of a life of virtue, 
 
 
 50. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 38–42.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 38.  
 53. Id. at 39.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 39–40.  
 57. Id. at 39–40.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE ORIGINS OF THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 211 
 
 
 
 
within which he believed man would flourish and experience, in the Greek 
language, “eudaimonia” or, in the English, “well being.”58  
Blackstone’s discussion of man’s reason and free will in relation to the 
natural law served as a foundation for his discussion of the English 
Common Law as a whole. Just as the laws of nature preceded the creation 
of plants and animals, and were intended to regulate and restrain them, so 
too had the law of human nature “existed in the nature of things antecedent 
to any positive precept.”59 The natural law laid down by the Creator not 
only was antecedent to positive law, but also was intended to regulate and 
restrain it. If men or countries were to flourish, they would do so by 
setting rules of action for their own conduct that fell within the boundary 
lines of God’s natural law.  
Thus, to Blackstone, the natural law was a set of principles, set in place 
by God, with which the positive law should not conflict. If man acted, in 
his free will, against the law of nature, he would fail to flourish as a 
human. Similarly, if a government passed laws through its legislators, or 
handed down judicial decisions through its judges, that were repugnant to 
the natural law principles set in place by God, that government, too, would 
fail to thrive. Blackstone saw this rule of action as the key deficiency of 
the English Common Law of his day: English judges and MPs had 
wandered from the first principles of the English Common Law, and the 
law had become inconsistent and corrupted as a result. Therefore, English 
lawmakers needed to be trained, not only in the content or system of the 
law, but also in the science of jurisprudence, or in the skills and 
knowledge necessary to know and apply first principles, to bring English 
Common Law back into harmony with the laws of nature and of nature’s 
God. In fact, in a rare nod to the Roman Civil Law, Blackstone argued that 
even Justinian had recognized these first principles when he structured his 
Institutes around three of the main “eternal, immutable laws of good and 
evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and 
which he has enabled human reason to discover.”60 Blackstone wanted to 
see God’s immutable laws elucidated in the study of the English Common 
Law as well.
61
  
 
 
 58. Aristotle defines eudaimonia as follows: “the good of man is an activity of the soul in 
conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and 
most complete.” Quoted in WILLIAM J. PRIOR, VIRTUE AND KNOWLEDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ANCIENT GREEK ETHICS 154 (1991). For a discussion of the Greek concept of eudaimonia and how it 
differs from current English language conceptions of happiness, see id. at 148–55. 
 59. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 40.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 36. In his work The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, Alan Watson has argued 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
212 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 7:195 
 
 
 
 
B. An Enlightenment Epistemology 
Blackstone was not alone in his understanding of the English law as a 
science based on first principles. But in arguing for the pursuit of 
happiness as a science of jurisprudence, Blackstone was arguing for a 
method of jurisprudence that was particularly rooted in the Enlightenment 
ideas of his day, as expressed by the Latitudinarian Anglicans and Scottish 
Common Sense Philosophers.
62
 
1. Anglican Theology: The Latitudinarian School 
In the two centuries following Henry VIII’s withdrawal of England 
from the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, England experienced 
ongoing turmoil in terms of its public and private religious identity, with 
accompanying purges—Anglican, Catholic, and Dissident—of the 
universities.
63
 The idea of an English church, separate from Rome (and 
needing to be increasingly and continually separated from Rome) is an 
idea Blackstone furthers at various points within his Commentaries. 
Blackstone’s discussion here is fairly polemical, but nevertheless 
reflective of the rhetoric of his times. Blackstone, a committed Anglican, 
attended the public sermons of the prominent Anglican clergymen of his 
day, where he heard the combination of philosophy, politics, and theology 
that had been a hallmark of English Anglicanism since the sixteenth 
century.
64
 That post-Reformation England saw continual transitions 
between rulers who were more or less friendly to Catholics, Protestants, 
and Dissenters meant that these ideas had political consequences. 
Blackstone weaves together theology, philosophy, and science throughout 
the Introduction to his Commentaries, and, although he engages in a 
broadly Protestant polemic against the Roman Catholic Church, his ideas 
are not broadly Protestant, or even broadly Anglican, but instead 
 
 
for the structural influence of Justinian’s Institutes on Blackstone’s Commentaries. Although I 
disagree with his larger conclusions, I do think Blackstone agreed with Justinian’s focus on immutable 
principles. See Alan Watson, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 97 YALE L.J. 795 (1987–
1988). 
 62. Blackstone’s work reflected the earlier work of Christopher St. German while also expressing 
more Anglican and Scottish Enlightenment views. 
 63. ANDERSON, supra note 40, at 5.  
 64. DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 70 n.43 (1938) (citing WILLIAM 
CONNOR SYDNEY, ENGLAND AND THE ENGLISH IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: CHAPTERS IN THE 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TIMES (2d ed. 1891)). For an excellent article that explores this 
interrelationship while also exploring the historiography, see James R. Jacob & Margaret C. Jacob, 
The Anglican Origins of Modern Science: The Metaphysical Foundations of the Whig Constitution, 71 
ISIS 251 (1980). 
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specifically reflective of the ideas of those Anglicans known as 
“Latitudinarians,” and the preaching of this group’s most prominent 
eighteenth century bishop, Joseph Butler.
65
  
In 1776, Bishop Joseph Butler published a compilation of fifteen 
sermons that he had preached while serving as Bishop of Rolls Chapel, 
one of England’s most prominent and publicly-attended Anglican 
churches.
66
 Butler’s sermons reflected the key ideas of the English 
Enlightenment, particularly as they were expressed by Latitudinarian 
Anglicans in the eighteenth century. Butler, and the larger group of 
Latitudinarians of which he was a part, tended to focus on the essential 
doctrines of Christianity.
67
 To discover those doctrines, the Latitudinarians 
argued for a Newtonian epistemology. This epistemology was summarized 
by John Tillotson, Archbishop of Canterbury, who argued that God has 
“‘commanded us nothing in the gospel that is either unsuitable to our 
reason or prejudicial to our interest . . . nothing but what is easy to be 
understood, and as easy to be practiced by an honest and willing mind.’”68 
They believed that the essential doctrines could be discovered through 
inductive reasoning applied to a “two books” theology—the book of 
revelation (the Holy Scriptures) and the book of nature
69— and that man’s 
own self-love, or the pursuit of his own real and substantial happiness, was 
the truest guide to that study.  
Latitudinarians like Joseph Butler were widely popular in England and 
the colonies in the 1700s.
70
 The place where Butler’s preaching is most 
reflected in Blackstone’s Commentaries is in Blackstone’s use of the 
phrase pursuit of happiness.
71
 Like Butler,
72
 Blackstone argued that man 
 
 
 65. Dr. Alan Charles Kors, The Pursuit of Happiness, Address at the Lehrman American Studies 
Institute of Princeton University (June 16, 2010). I attended Dr. Kors’ talk on Bishop Butler’s 
understanding of pursuit of happiness in the midst of conducting my research. I am indebted to Dr. 
Kors for pointing me to Bishop Butler and for the time he spent talking with me about my own 
conclusions regarding Blackstone’s and the Founders’ understandings of pursuit of happiness. The 
ideas shared in Kors’ lecture have provided a framework for the following discussion of Butler’s 
understanding of the pursuit of happiness. 
 66. THE WORKS OF BISHOP BUTLER 4 (David E. White ed., 2006); ERNEST CAMPBELL 
MOSSNER, BISHOP BUTLER AND THE AGE OF REASON: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT 3 
(1971); W.A. SPOONER, BISHOP BUTLER 12 (1901).  
 67. HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA, 17 (reprt. 1979). 
 68. Id. at 17. May is quoting from Tillotson, “The Precepts of Christianity not Grievous,” in 
Works (10 v., London, 1737), xiv. 
 69. Raymond D. Tumbleson, “Reason and Religion”: The Science of Anglicanism, 57 J. OF THE 
HISTORY OF IDEAS 131, 134 (1996) [hereinafter Reason and Religion]. 
 70. MAY, supra note 67, at 17.  
 71. Butler and Blackstone were drawing on a shared learned culture comprised of ideas that, in 
many cases, hearkened back to antiquity. For example, Blackstone’s discussion of pursuit of happiness 
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can learn about God’s design for human nature by studying “the 
constitution and frame of humanity.”73 Like Butler,74 Blackstone argued 
that from the study of our nature, we could induce the purpose God has for 
humans, and that purpose is for humans to live in harmony with “the laws 
of eternal justice,” which is accomplished through the pursuit of man’s 
“real” and “substantial happiness.”75 And, like Butler,76 Blackstone argued 
that humans may choose not to live in harmony with that design, but that, 
by man’s unique combination of “reason and freewill,”77 that choice would 
be based on knowledge and free will, not ignorance or determinism.
78
 In 
this way, both Butler and Blackstone carried out Sir Isaac Newton’s 
charge “‘that the most simple laws of nature are observed in the structure 
of a great part of the Universe, that the philosophy ought there to 
begin. . . .’”79  
Drawing on the epistemological notions of Butler and the 
Latitudinarian Anglicans, Blackstone argues for the pursuit of happiness 
as a science of jurisprudence that forges a middle way between what he 
deemed to be the Catholics’ excessive focus on reason and the 
Enthusiasts’ excessive focus on conscience. The Latitudinarians had “an 
almost obsessive concern for design, order, and harmony as the primary 
manifestations of God’s role in the universe,”80 and it would not be a 
stretch to say that Blackstone did as well. He viewed the pursuit of 
happiness as a way to restore beauty and order to the Common Law.  
In considering some of the key ideas of both Butler and the 
Latitudinarians, we can see that, in defining and promoting the pursuit of 
happiness, or one’s own “self-love” as a jurisprudential science, 
Blackstone is speaking a language that is meaningful to his 
contemporaries. It is a language that affirms the Latitudinarian focus on 
 
 
reflects that of Butler, and both men are voicing ideas previously expressed in John Locke’s AN ESSAY 
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1691) and the philosophy of classical antiquity. 
 72. Kors, supra note 65.  
 73. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 40.  
 74. Kors, supra note 65.  
 75. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 40–41.  
 76. Kors, supra note 65.  
 77. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 39.  
 78. Kors, supra note 65. Blackstone describes both animals and inanimate matter as “governed 
by laws” that are “fixed and invariable.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 38. Similarly, “[m]an, 
considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a 
dependent being.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 39. Where man differs from animals and inanimate 
matter is in his “reason and freewill,” and he “is commanded to make use of those faculties in the 
general regulation of his behaviour.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 39.  
 79. Jacob & Jacob, supra note 64, at 264. 
 80. Id. at 258. 
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individual free will
81
 and the ability of the layperson to induce first 
principles through study of the two books: nature and revelation. It is a 
language that turns away from the deductive, syllogistic reasoning of the 
Scholastics and turns toward the inductive, experience-based reasoning 
that was so appealing to the Latitudinarian Anglicans of Blackstone’s day. 
Men like Butler and Blackstone did not view science, religion, philosophy, 
and law as distinct categories, but as “natural science,” “natural religion,” 
“natural philosophy,” and “natural law”—four interrelated ways of 
exploring and learning about the natural order of the world as God had 
created it. According to Blackstone, the English system of law and science 
of jurisprudence were capable of being perfected because they were, and 
increasingly could be, in harmony with and reflective of, the beauty of the 
natural order. In making epistemological arguments based on an inductive 
study of nature and in appealing to the outcomes of harmony, beauty, and 
order, Butler and Blackstone reflected not only the philosophy of 
seventeenth and eighteenth century Latitudinarian Anglicans, but also the 
philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment’s Common Sense School. 
2. Scottish Philosophy: The Common Sense School 
Blackstone’s emphasis on “our own self-love” as a “prompter to 
enquire after and pursue the rule of right” evokes epistemological notions 
present in the Scottish Enlightenment. Blackstone is arguing for pursuit of 
happiness as a simple and effective science of jurisprudence, or way of 
knowing “what we call ethics, or natural law.”82 Blackstone believed that 
this law could be discovered not only through reason, but also through 
every man’s understanding of his own “real and substantial happiness.” 
The pursuit of happiness, for Blackstone, was not one’s effort to 
experience a state of being happy, as we would consider it in twenty-first 
century terms, but, instead, a method by which man could be become most 
fully human. In this context, Blackstone’s “real” and “substantial” 
happiness was real in that it was “not fictitious; not imaginary; true; 
genuine.”83 It was substantial in that it pertained to the substance or 
essence of what it meant to be fully human
84
 and, therefore, to be happy; it 
was, from the Latin substantia, “literally, that which stands under,” or that 
 
 
 81. Jacob & Jacob, supra note 64, at 258. 
 82. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 39–41.  
 83. See “Real” in JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1645. “Real” is a synonym for 
“Substantial,” which is defined as “real; actually existing.” 
 84. “Substance” is defined as “the essential part.” JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 
1972.  
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which lies beneath.
85
 Thus, to Blackstone, to pursue one’s happiness was 
to pursue the essential character which lay underneath or, in other words, 
to pursue the natural law principles that pertained to humans, and, 
therefore, to understand the principles that should form both the 
foundation and boundary lines for all legitimate human law.  
To discover these principles, the Scholastics had adopted a deductive 
legal science built on “syllogistic, ‘geometric’ reasoning.”86 In contrast, 
the Common Sense school of philosophy was marked by “empirical 
observation and careful inductive reasoning” by men who “believed that 
they could discover natural legal principles just as Newton had discovered 
the laws of nature.”87 When Blackstone describes the English law as a 
system and a science, the science he is referring to is reflective of the 
Common Sense school of the Scottish Enlightenment, a school that would 
have been very familiar to Latitudinarian Anglicans like Butler and 
Blackstone. In fact, both Butler and Blackstone discuss epistemology in 
ways that reflect the writings of Thomas Reid, a key thinker of the 
Scottish Enlightenment Common Sense school, whose writings were in 
opposition to the skepticism of fellow Scottish Enlightenment thinker 
David Hume.
88
 Where Hume argued that there are no innate ideas and that, 
instead, our constantly fluctuating perceptions form our understanding of 
the natural world, Reid argued for self-evident “‘First Principles’” that 
form the basis for the advancement of knowledge.
89
 In both natural and 
moral philosophy, these first principles were discovered by induction 
through observation.
90
 This type of philosophy was not only a foundation 
for knowledge about the natural world; it also “could serve as a foundation 
for moral knowledge as well. . . . Just as our eyes enabled us to see objects 
 
 
 85. Substance and Substantial, in WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1897 
(1996). This same definition appears in the etymology for “Substance” (circa 1330) in the Oxford 
English Dictionary. “Substance, n.” in the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Online Edition, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/193042?redirectedFrom=substance (accessed Oct. 14, 2012). 
 86. Charles L. Barzun, Common Sense and Legal Science, 90 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2004). 
Barzun argues for the development of inductive legal science in early America. As demonstrated in the 
discussion that follows, the same common sense legal science he sees in the Scottish Enlightenment’s 
Common Sense School and nineteenth-century early America is reflected in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries. Later, I will demonstrate that this understanding of legal science was present in pursuit 
of happiness in the Declaration of Independence, as well. 
 87. Id. at 1055. 
 88. Id. at 1062–65; see also ALEXANDER BROADIE, A HISTORY OF SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY 246–
51 (2009). 
 89. Barzun, supra note 86, at 1062–63, 1065.  
 90. Id. at 1065.  
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and our ears enabled us to hear sounds, so too our moral sense enabled us 
to distinguish between right and wrong, virtue and vice.”91  
The work that Reid sees as being possible through moral sense is the 
same type of work Blackstone expects pursuit of happiness to do. It 
explains why Blackstone believes that the Holy Scriptures can be a check 
on pursuit of happiness: both the Scriptures and the moral sense that works 
itself out through pursuit of happiness are means of identifying first 
principles of right and wrong. Thus, whether it is inductive reading of 
Scripture or inductive reading of the natural world, a man’s moral sense 
guides him in the pursuit of happiness. It is not pure reason, and it is not 
just a feeling. It is a “common intuition”92 woven into the fabric of man by 
the Creator God. 
Reid argued that it was possible, but not necessary, to cultivate this 
moral sense through education.
93
 He also argued that man’s errors in moral 
philosophy did not indicate that first principles of right and wrong did not 
exist.
94
 Blackstone echoed both of these ideas. First, as discussed above, 
Blackstone argued for education of university students in the English 
Common Law. Blackstone echoed the second of these ideas when he 
argued for pursuit of happiness as a science of jurisprudence by which 
every man could identify the first principles of the Common Law and then 
use those principles to correct the Common Law’s man-made errors, 
leading to its improvement and perfection over time.
95
  
C. Improvement and Perfection of the Common Law 
When Blackstone talked about reforming the Common Law, he used 
two terms: “improvement” and “perfection.” To his eighteenth-century 
readers, both would be indicative of the idea that, through experience and 
observation, law makers could induce first principles that then could be 
referred to in order to “improve” the Common Law over time. As the 
Common Law was improved, it would become more perfect; in other 
words, it would increasingly reflect the order, beauty, and harmony of the 
 
 
 91. Id. at 1066.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1066–67.  
 95. This “Enlightenment idea of progress through time, toward ever higher stages of civilization” 
was held by Thomas Jefferson, as well. Peter S. Onuf, Ancients, Moderns, and the Progress of 
Mankind: Thomas Jefferson’s Classical World, in THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE CLASSICAL WORLD, AND 
EARLY AMERICA 35, 36 (Peter S. Onuf & Nicholas P. Cole eds., 2011). 
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natural law. Blackstone articulated the improvement and perfection of the 
Common Law in terms of history and architecture. 
1. History: An Ancient, English Common Law 
Blackstone viewed his own work in teaching the laws of England in 
terms of revival, tracing the Common Law back to the Christian kings of 
England’s Anglo-Saxon period.96 A search for first founders was popular 
during the Enlightenment; following Henry VIII’s break from the Roman 
Catholic Church and the establishment of the Church of England came a 
corresponding focus on England’s distinct past, with an emphasis on the 
Anglo-Saxon period and King Alfred as a “symbol of freedom.”97  
According to both Blackstone and his predecessor, Sir Edward Coke, 
King Alfred was “the legume Anglicanarum conditor of the early 
Common Law, while King Edward the Confessor is considered the 
restitutor thereof . . . Alfred founded the Common Law and the Confessor 
restored it . . . .”98 In seeking to revive an ancient past for the English 
Common Law, Blackstone did well to choose Edward and Alfred as his 
models. According to popular histories of the time, King Edward had 
combined the disparate Anglo-Saxon law codes into one coherent and 
cohesive law;
99
 as an Anglo-Saxon king, Edward provided an identifiable 
person behind the theoretical argument of an ancient English Common 
Law.
100
 Although Edward is important to Blackstone, his importance 
primarily comes from reinstituting that Common Law which King Alfred 
had previously founded. Blackstone believed that King Alfred’s law code 
contained “many of the principal maxims of the Common Law.”101 With 
Alfred’s focus on training in literacy and learning, his study of the Latin 
language, and his emphasis on reform and renaissance,
102
 Alfred made an 
ideal ancient founder for the English Common Law.  
 
 
 96. See generally BLACKSTONE, supra note 13.  
 97. THE ANGLO-SAXONS 241–42 (James Campbell ed., 1991); DAVID HORSPOOL, KING 
ALFRED: BURNT CAKES AND OTHER LEGENDS 171 (Harvard Univ. Press 2006). Although, Horspool 
points out, others saw Alfred as “a paragon of unquestionable royal authority.” HORSPOOL, at 171; 
THE ANGLO-SAXONS, at 241–42. 
 98. KURT VON S. KYNELL, SAXON AND MEDIEVAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE ENGLISH COMMON 
LAW 213 (2000). 
 99. FRANK BARLOW, EDWARD THE CONFESSOR 178 (1970). 
 100. For an argument that Edward’s work in law is more legend than history, see THEODORE F.T. 
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 256 (5th ed. 1956).  
 101. KYNELL, supra note 98, at 212. 
 102. ALFRED THE GREAT: ASSER’S LIFE OF KING ALFRED AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY SOURCES 
92, 99, 107 (Simon Keynes & Michael Lapidge trans., 1983). For a discussion of Alfred’s program of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE ORIGINS OF THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 219 
 
 
 
 
As part of his program for literacy and learning, Alfred argued for the 
“pursuit of wisdom” as “a wise man’s option” and “a ruler’s duty.”103 
Alfred’s biographer, Asser, compares Alfred to King Solomon, with the 
understanding that each man “‘sought wisdom from God.’”104 Wisdom is 
defined as “. . . knowledge of what is true or right coupled with just 
judgment as to action; sagacity, discernment, or insight.”105 Its 
contemporary meaning hails from the word’s Saxon roots, where it was 
defined as “sapience; the power of judging rightly.”106 In other words, to 
pursue wisdom is first to be able to know what is true and right, and then 
to be able to apply that knowledge to its best (right or most fit) use. Alfred 
believed that man’s ability to reason, the pursuit of wisdom, and the 
proper development of the law were intertwined. Reason, the essential 
characteristic of a human being, was what allowed a man to engage in the 
pursuit of wisdom, which is the right or fit application of knowledge. If a 
ruler understood how to rightly know and then apply the content of the 
law, then the law would develop justly. Conversely, if a ruler was not able 
either to rightly know the law or to rightly apply it, then the law that 
developed would be unjust.  
Alfred believed that faulty reasoning stemmed from lack of learning, 
and he therefore promoted literacy and learning in his realm, going so far 
as to order his judges either “to learn to read or quit office.”107 Alfred then 
included revelation, the divine law as revealed by God in the Holy 
Scriptures, as a “way of knowing,” describing the revelation as “Mosaic 
Law” (a term synonymous with the law of the Old Testament) and “Christ 
as True Wisdom” (a phrase synonymous with both “the Law of Christ” 
and the teachings of the New Testament).  
 
 
literacy and how Alfred may have intended it to help forge a common, English identity, see 
HORSPOOL, supra note 97, at 179–80. 
 103. THE ANGLO-SAXONS, supra note 97, at 156. David Horspool supports this connection, 
claiming that “[t]o Alfred a personal interest in wisdom was a facet of true Christian kingship.” 
HORSPOOL, supra note 97, at 128. 
 104. HORSPOOL, supra note 97, at 131. 
 105. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at 2181. Samuel 
Johnson traces the word “wisdom” back to Saxon roots, defining it as “Sapience; the power of judging 
rightly.” JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 2285. The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY defines 
wisdom as the “capacity of judging rightly in matters relating to life and conduct” and dates it to Old 
Saxon, as early as 888. The Oxford English Dictionary also defines wisdom as “one of the 
manifestations of the divine nature in Jesus Christ.” “wisdom, n” in OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
supra note 85, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/229491?rskey=CpNCo8& result=1&isAdvanced=false 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2012). 
 106. Id. 
 107. THE ANGLO-SAXONS, supra note 97, at 156.  
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Alfred’s discussion of the pursuit of wisdom is remarkably similar to 
Blackstone’s discussion of the role to be played by the pursuit of 
happiness in English law reform. Alfred, like Blackstone, viewed both 
revelation and the pursuit of wisdom (what Blackstone described as the 
pursuit of happiness) as jurisprudential frameworks that could remedy the 
defects that resulted from faulty reasoning on topics of law. Blackstone 
believed that remedying these defects was necessary in order to improve 
and perfect the ancient English Common Law, a process he analogized to 
restoring a poorly-remodeled house to its original foundation and plan.  
2. Architecture: “Solid foundations” and “An Extensive Plan” 
Blackstone’s views on the improvement and perfection of the Common 
Law reflect not only his understanding of King Alfred as the ancient 
founder of the Common Law, but also Blackstone’s description of the 
Common Law itself as a house, whose structure had been altered and 
whose ancient and true foundation had been obscured by faulty additions 
over time. According to Blackstone, these faulty additions needed to be 
removed so that the order, harmony, and beauty of the original blueprint 
could be revealed and so that the new builders could rely upon the true 
foundation in making additions for the future.
108
 Blackstone stated that 
England’s “admirable system of laws” had been “built upon the soundest 
foundations, and approved by the experience of ages”109 but that the 
English law had been corrupted over time. He argued that “it’s [sic] 
symmetry has been destroyed, it’s [sic] proportions distorted, and it’s [sic] 
majestic simplicity exchanged for specious embellishments and fantastic 
novelties.”110  
Blackstone ascribed to future lawyers, judges, jurors, and MPs a high 
sense of duty in improving and perfecting the laws of England and urged 
them to do so by recovering the ancient foundations of the Common Law 
and the foundational principles that should guide its development.
111
 The 
idea of perfection or improvement had its roots in the science and religion 
of the English Enlightenment. The philosophes of the Enlightenment 
 
 
 108. For an excellent discussion of architecture in Blackstone’s Commentaries, as well as his 
other works, see Carol Matthews, A ‘Model of the Old House’: Architecture in Blackstone’s Life and 
Commentaries, in BLACKSTONE AND HIS COMMENTARIES: BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY 15–34 
(Wilfrid Prest ed., 2009) and WILFRID PREST, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE: LAW AND LETTERS IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, 44–48, 67–68, 77–79 (2008). 
 109. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 5. 
 110. Id. at 10. 
 111. Id. at 35. 
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looked to England and saw that “progress in one sphere generated progress 
in others;” they believed “that England was rich, happy, and free” and 
“that these characteristics depended upon and reinforced one another.”112 
John Gordon, archdeacon of Lincoln, argued that “the world is . . . in a 
state of general improvement,”113 with the result “[t]hat mankind at present 
is wiser, happier, and better than it ever was before.”114 
Blackstone believed that the improvement of the Common Law had 
begun with King Alfred, stating that Alfred’s “mighty genius prompted 
him to undertake a great and necessary work . . . no less than to new model 
the Constitution; to rebuild it on a plan that should endure for ages; and, 
out of its old discordant materials, which were heaped upon each other in 
rude irregularity, to form one uniform and well-connected whole.”115 
Indeed, Blackstone described the “two books” from which first principles 
could be induced in architectural terms: “Upon these two foundations, the 
law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to 
say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these.”116  
Blackstone’s choice of the architectural term “foundation” here is 
telling. A foundation is both the underlying building surface and the guide 
for the structure of the building—it both provides stability for the structure 
and directs its form. It is in light of this metaphor that Blackstone 
alternately talks about the principles upon which the Common Law should 
be built and the principles that should direct the development (and 
improvement and perfection) of the Common Law.   
Historian Carol Matthews has compiled Blackstone’s architectural 
views of the Common Law as they developed over time, and they are 
worth reproducing in full here.
117
 In 1746, Blackstone described the 
Common Law as a building in need of improvement:  
‘I have sometimes thought that the Common Law, as it stood in 
Littleton’s Days, resembled a regular Edifice: where the Apartments 
were properly disposed, leading one into another without 
Confusion; where every part was subservient to the whole, all 
uniting in one beautiful Symmetry: & every Room had its distinct 
 
 
 112. PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION, VOLUME II: THE SCIENCE OF 
FREEDOM 24–25 (1969) [hereinafter GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT II]. 
 113. Ronald S. Crane, Anglican Apologetics and the Idea of Progress, 1699–1745 (Concluded), 
31 MODERN PHILOLOGY 349, 379 (1934).  
 114. Id. at 379. 
 115. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 403–04. 
 116. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
 117. Matthews, supra note 108, at 15–34. 
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Office allotted to it. But as it is now, swol’n, shrunk, curtailed, 
enlarged, altered & mangled by various & contradictory Statutes 
&c; it resembles the same Edifice, with many of its most useful 
Parts pulled down, with preposterous Additions in other Places, of 
different Materials & coarse Workmanship according to the Whim, 
or Prejudice, or private Convenience of the Builders. By which 
means the Communication of the Parts is destroyed, & their 
Harmony quite annihilated; & now it remains a huge, irregular Pile, 
with many noble Apartments, though awkwardly put together, & 
some of them of no visible Use at present. But if one desires to 
know why they were built, to what End or Use, how they 
communicated with the rest & the like; he must necessarily carry in 
his Head the Model of the old House, which will be the only Clue to 
guide him through this new Labyrinth.’118 
Blackstone used the same analogy, in a modified version, in 1758 in his 
first Vinerian lecture, where he stated that the Common Law: 
‘has fared like other venerable edifices of antiquity, which rash and 
unexperienced workmen have ventured to new-dress and refine, 
with all the rage of modern improvement. Hence frequently its 
symmetry has been destroyed, its proportions distorted, and its 
majestic simplicity exchanged for specious embellishments and 
fantastic novelties.’119 
Seven years later, Blackstone once more invokes the architectural 
metaphor in Volume Four of his Commentaries:
120
  
‘It hath been the endeavour of these commentaries, however the 
execution may have succeeded, to examine [the common law’s] 
solid foundations, to mark out its extensive plan, to explain the 
use and distribution of its parts, and from the harmonious 
concurrence of those several parts to demonstrate the elegant 
proportion of the whole. We have taken occasion to admire at every 
turn the noble monuments of ancient simplicity, and the more 
curious refinements of modern art. Nor have its faults been 
concealed from view; for faults it has, lest we should be tempted to 
think it of more than human structure: defects, chiefly arising from 
 
 
 118. Id. at 29 (quoting Blackstone, Letters, 4). 
 119. Id. at 29–30 (quoting Blackstone, Commentaries vol 1, p. 10 (‘Introduction’): first published 
as A Discourse on the Study of the Law (Oxford 1758)). 
 120. Id. at 30 (citing Blackstone, Commentaries vol 4, p. 436). 
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the decays of time, or the rage of unskilful [sic] improvements in 
later ages. To sustain, to repair, to beautify this noble pile, is a 
charge entrusted principally to the nobility, and such gentlemen 
of the kingdom, as are delegated by their country to parliament. 
The protection of THE LIBERTY OF BRITAIN is a duty which 
they owe to themselves, who enjoy it; to their ancestors, who 
transmitted it down; and to their posterity, who will claim at their 
hands, this the best birthright, the noblest inheritance of 
mankind.’121  
In his final architectural metaphor, we see Blackstone’s belief in the 
Common Law’s “ancient simplicity,” which he believed to be manifest in 
the Founding of King Alfred and the Restoration of King Edward. We see 
his acknowledgement of the “defects” that occurred in the law over time, 
some of which he attributes to “unskilful [sic] improvements.” We see 
Blackstone’s desire to educate his students, so that they can make the 
skillful improvements necessary “[t]o sustain, to repair, to beautify this 
noble pile” should they one day serve in Parliament. We see Blackstone’s 
charge to these students to protect and then, through transmission to their 
posterity, preserve the “LIBERTY of BRITAIN,” which preservation 
would lead to the perfection of the Common Law. 
In his first architectural analogy, Blackstone argued that in order to 
understand the various rooms of the Common Law as it then stood, “to 
know why they were built, to what End or Use, how they communicated 
with the rest & the like; he must necessarily carry in his Head the Model 
of the old House, which will be the only Clue to guide him through this 
new Labyrinth.”122 In his final metaphor, he explained that his goal for his 
Commentaries was to “examine [the common law’s] solid foundations” 
and then “mark out its extensive plan.”123 With that model in mind, 
Blackstone could then “explain the use and distribution of [the Common 
Law’s] parts, and from the harmonious concurrence of those several parts 
to demonstrate the elegant proportion of the whole.”  
In these two phrases, we see a distillation of Blackstone’s two-part goal 
for legal reform in England. As evidenced by the latter phrase, he sought 
to provide his students with an education in the content of the English 
Common Law, including a discussion of its different parts, and how they 
related to one another to create a whole. As evidenced by the former 
 
 
 121. Id. at 30 (emphasis added) (citing Blackstone, Commentaries vol 4, p. 436). 
 122. Id. at 29 (emphasis added) (citing Blackstone, Letters, 4). 
 123. Id. at 30 (emphasis added) (citing Blackstone, Commentaries vol 4, p. 436). 
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phrase, Blackstone also sought to provide his students with an education in 
the science of jurisprudence that would enable them to “examine [the 
Common Law’s] solid foundations,” which were the law of nature and the 
law of revelation, and “mark out its extensive plan.” The science of 
jurisprudence that Blackstone believed was best suited to that task was the 
pursuit of happiness. 
According to Blackstone, the pursuit of happiness reflected the ancient 
wisdom of Anglo-Saxon King Alfred and the moral philosophy of the 
Latitudinarian Anglicans. It embraced the Common Sense philosophy of 
the Scottish Enlightenment and, in so doing, avoided the undue 
complexities of the Scholastics and the undue emotionalism of the 
Enthusiasts. It provided a means by which the layperson, no less than the 
skilled lawyer, could induce from revelation and the law of nature those 
principles that formed the foundation and framework of the Common Law. 
If the Common Law was a house, and Blackstone regularly described it as 
such, the pursuit of happiness was its cornerstone. The question that then 
remains is to what degree, if any, Blackstone’s definition of the pursuit of 
happiness is reflected in the Founders’124 use of the phrase. 
II. THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
A. Textual Context: Placement and Drafting 
1. Placement 
The pursuit of happiness is located at the beginning of the Declaration, 
in a two-paragraph summary of the ends of government. Key passages 
have been highlighted in bold:  
When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one 
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them 
with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the 
separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of 
 
 
 124. I have chosen to discuss the authorship of the Declaration in terms of “the Founders” for two 
reasons. First, I wanted to place the authorship of the Declaration in its larger context. Although 
Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration, the language of the Declaration was debated, altered, and 
finally approved by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and the Founders present at the Continental 
Congress. The meaning of any part of the Declaration may have begun with what Jefferson intended, 
but ultimately depended upon what the other Founders understood that language to mean as they 
debated, altered, and finally approved it at the Continental Congress. Second, I have referred to these 
men as Founders (as opposed to Framers) because they, through the Declaration, founded the new 
United States of America while the men who gathered to create the Articles of Confederation and, 
later, the Constitution of the United States, framed its government. 
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nature’s god entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel 
them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self evident; 
that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: that to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form 
of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of 
the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, 
laying it’s foundation on such principles, and organising it’s powers 
in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety 
and happiness.
125
  
As shown above, the Declaration begins by assuming that “the laws of 
nature and of nature’s god” entitle humans to a certain type of earthly 
government, one that will “secure” the unalienable rights with which men 
are “endowed by their creator,” including “life, liberty & the pursuit of 
happiness.” When a specific government fails to operate according to 
these principles, when it “becomes destructive of these ends,” then it is 
“necessary” for the governed to separate and to “assume” the “separate & 
equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s god entitle them.” 
Thus, according to the Declaration, man’s unalienable right to “the pursuit 
of happiness” is to be protected immediately by man’s earthly government 
and is to be protected indefinitely by “the laws of nature and of nature’s 
god.” 
As discussed previously, in his work, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, English jurist William Blackstone defines the pursuit of 
happiness as a means by which man could know the law of nature as it 
pertains to humans. If man pursued his happiness, he could not help but 
live in harmony with the law of nature. Similarly, if man sought to live in 
harmony with the law nature, he could not help but achieve happiness: 
For [the Creator] has so intimately connected, so inseparably 
interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each 
individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the 
former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but 
induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of 
justice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature 
 
 
 125. The Declaration of Independence, as included in MAIER, supra note 4, at 236. 
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with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely 
to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly surmised; 
but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal 
precept, “that man should pursue his own happiness.” This is the 
foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law.
126
  
The parallels between this portion of Blackstone’s Commentaries and the 
Declaration of Independence are significant. Both assume that “the law of 
nature and of nature’s God” is a governing order that both precedes and 
prescribes the authority of human government. Both place “pursuit of 
happiness” within a larger discussion of “the law of nature and of nature’s 
God.” Both assume “pursuit of happiness” to be a right given to man by 
his Creator. However, where Blackstone specifically defines “pursuit of 
happiness,” the Declaration does not. What does this phrase mean within 
the context of the Declaration? Is Blackstone’s understanding of pursuit of 
happiness reflected in the Founders’ understanding of the phrase?  
2. Drafting 
The creation of the Declaration of Independence provides much insight 
into its context. It is common to discuss the Declaration as Thomas 
Jefferson’s original document, and, indeed, he did create the original draft. 
But we go astray if we consider the original intent of Jefferson, as opposed 
to the original meaning of the Declaration to all who drafted and approved 
it, including the Committee of Five, and the Continental Congress. In fact, 
given both John Adams’s and Thomas Jefferson’s claims that they did not 
intend for the Declaration to promote any new ideas,
127
 it would make the 
most sense to study the structure and language of the Declaration in terms 
of the prevalent ideas of the time.  
When the Continental Congress determined it was time to draft a 
document to declare independence from Great Britain, it appointed a 
Committee of Five to complete the task.
128
 This committee included 
Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and 
Robert Livingston. After some discussion, it was agreed that Jefferson be 
the one to draft the document.
129
 
 
 
 126. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 40–41. 
 127. See BECKER, supra note 4, at 177, 207–09. 
 128. For the following account of the Declaration’s drafting, see BECKER, supra note 4, at 135–93 
and JOHN HAZELTON, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ITS HISTORY 141–93 (1906).  
 129. John Adams later claimed that Jefferson encouraged Adams to write it, but then Adams 
convinced Jefferson to draft it. Jefferson claimed that the Committee of Five appointed him to write it. 
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Once Jefferson had completed his initial draft, he sent it to John Adams 
and Benjamin Franklin for suggestions. Jefferson’s selection of reviewers 
here is interesting, given Adams’s study of English law and his devout 
love of the classics and Christianity, and Franklin’s adherence to the 
scientific ideals and Common Sense philosophy of the Enlightenment.  
Adams and Franklin made few changes, and those they did make were 
merely in wording. Neither of the men edited the phrase “pursuit of 
happiness,” or its inclusion as an unalienable right. After incorporating the 
changes from Adams and Franklin, Jefferson submitted the draft to the 
Committee of Five. By the time the draft made it through the Committee 
of Five, twenty-six alterations had been made.
130
 Twenty-three of the 
changes were “in phraseology” and were made by Adams, Franklin, and 
Jefferson himself.
131
 The other three changes consisted of a three-
paragraph addition to Jefferson’s list of grievances against the King, 
before the draft was given to the Committee of Five.
132
 Yet, no one on the 
Committee edited the phrase “pursuit of happiness,” or its inclusion as an 
unalienable right. 
From here, the Committee of Five submitted a draft to the Continental 
Congress. The Continental Congress made many changes to the document; 
Jefferson viewed them as “depredations.”133 Jefferson became so low 
during the editing process, that Franklin was moved to tell Jefferson a joke 
in order to cheer him up.
134
 The changes made by the Continental 
Congress ranged from the grammatical (such as “neglected utterly” to 
“utterly neglected” in the second grievance against the King)135 to the 
monumental (such as the Congress’s deletion of the entire passage 
whereby Jefferson charges King George III with responsibility for human 
slavery in the American colonies).
136
 The record of changes made in the 
Continental Congress suggests that every word and phrase of the 
Declaration was carefully considered. However, even here, we see no 
editing of the phrase “pursuit of happiness” and no changes made to its 
inclusion or placement in the Declaration. 
 
 
BECKER, supra note 4, at 135–36. 
 130. Id. at 157, 160–66. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. The best versions for noting the differences between Jefferson’s draft and the version as it 
existed after the Congressional revisions are located in WILLS, supra note 10, at 374–79; BECKER, 
supra note 4, at 174–84, and MAIER, supra note 4, at 235–41. For the final copy as recorded on 
parchment paper, see BECKER, supra note 4, at 185–93. 
 134. BECKER, supra note 4, at 207–09. 
 135. Id. at 177. 
 136. Id. at 185–93. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
228 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 7:195 
 
 
 
 
What are we to make of the fact that the phrase “pursuit of happiness” 
was not edited at all, either by Jefferson, Adams, or Franklin, within the 
Committee of Five, or within the Continental Congress as a whole? The 
lack of editing here would seem to suggest one of two things: either the 
phrase “pursuit of happiness” really was a “glittering generality” with a 
non-substantive meaning to which no one would object, or the phrase 
“pursuit of happiness” had a substantive meaning that was both 
understood by and agreeable to the wide variety of individuals involved in 
the Declaration’s drafting. The answer can be found by exploring the 
ideas of the Declaration in their historical context.  
B. “No New Ideas”: Four Strands of Founding Era Thought 
What did the Declaration mean at the time of the Founding? When 
asked about the drafting of the Declaration, both John Adams and Thomas 
Jefferson stated that it contained no new ideas. Adams stated that “there is 
not an idea in it, but what had been hackney’d in Congress for two years 
before”137 while Jefferson claimed, “I did not consider it as any part of my 
charge to invent new ideas altogether & to offer no sentiment which had 
ever been expressed before.”138 What, then, counted as old ideas at the 
time of the Declaration?  
Four key strands of thought influenced the men of the Founding Era: 
English law and legal theory; the history and philosophy of Classical 
Antiquity; Christianity; and the Scottish Enlightenment’s emphasis on 
Newtonian Science. Further study leads to two conclusions: (1) the 
Founders did not separate these strands of thought into distinct categories, 
but intermingled them
139
 in what they understood to be an intellectually 
 
 
 137. Adams’s full quotation is as follows: “There is not an idea in it, but what had been hackney’d 
in Congress for two years before. The substance of it is contained in the Declaration of rights . . . 
Indeed, the essence of it is contained in a pamphlet . . . composed by James Otis . . . .” HAZELTON, 
supra note 128, at 143. Hazelton is quoting John Adams. 
 138. The full quote from Jefferson is included in Jefferson’s August 30, 1823 letter to James 
Madison. Jefferson agreed in part and disagreed in part with Adams, stating: “Pickering’s 
observations, and mr Adams’s in addition, ‘that it contained no new ideas, that it is a common place 
compilation, it’s sentiments hacknied in Congress for two years before, and it’s essence contained in 
Otis’s pamphlet,’ may all be true. of that I am not to be the judge. Rich. H. Lee charged it as copied 
from Locke’s treatise on government. Otis’s pamphlet I never saw, & whether I had gathered my ideas 
from reading or reflection I do not know. I know only that I turned to neither book or pamphlet while 
writing it. I did not consider it as any part of my charge to invent new ideas altogether & to offer no 
sentiment which had ever been expressed before.” Id. at 144–45. Hazelton is quoting Jefferson. 
 139. Carl Richard argues well for an intermingling of these ideas at the Founding. See CARL J. 
RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 
(1994). Richard’s work provides a jumping-off point for my exploration of key ideas that influenced 
Jefferson, Adams, and Franklin, in general, and their thinking on the pursuit of happiness, in particular. 
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coherent fashion, and (2) each of these strands of thought included a core 
thesis that was in harmony with Blackstone’s understanding of the pursuit 
of happiness. The four strands are as follows: 
1. English Law and Legal Theory 
Blackstone’s Commentaries comprised the most comprehensive 
compilation of English law in its day. When Blackstone began his 
Commentaries with a discussion of the law of nature and of nature’s God 
as the immutable legal principles upon which the entire English Common 
Law is premised,
140
 he did so within a larger eighteenth-century 
understanding of natural laws that were to guide the actions of 
governments and men.
141
  
In England, that understanding built on seventeenth-century 
constitutional struggles between Lord Coke and Parliament, on the one 
hand, and the Stuart Monarchs, the other.
142
 These battles resulted in the 
English Civil War of 1642–1649 and culminated with the execution of 
King Charles I for Treason in 1649. The constitutional battles revived with 
the return of the Stuart Monarchy in 1660 and were resolved only through 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which established Parliamentary 
supremacy and produced the English Bill of Rights in 1689.
143
  
The colonists looked back to the struggles between Parliament and the 
King in seventeenth-century England as a time in comparison with their 
own struggles with England.
144
 From the 1760s forward, the colonists had 
been petitioning Britain in terms of their fundamental rights, as understood 
 
 
Where Richard emphasizes the intermingling of the four strands, I argue for a point of convergence 
that cuts across all four strands and is instrumental to understanding both the pursuit of happiness and 
the Declaration, as a whole. Bernard Bailyn similarly discusses Founding Era ideas as “a blend of 
ideas and beliefs” (BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION v 
(englarged ed. 2012)) while Gordon Wood uses like terms to argue for “a general pattern of beliefs 
about the social process–a set of common assumptions about history, society, and politics that 
connected and made significant seemingly discrete and unrelated ideas.” GORDON WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787 viii (1969). 
 140. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 13. 
 141. BECKER, supra note 4, at 26–27. 
 142. This description of seventeenth-century English history is promulgated by Blackstone and the 
Founders; it is how they viewed their legal history, and how they used it as evidence to support their 
advocacy for changes in law. Many historians today have different ideas about the causes and 
consequences of the events described here. 
 143. KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 7–8 (2d ed. 
1996). 
 144. James C. Spalding, Loyalist as Royalist, Patriot as Puritan: The American Revolution as a 
Repetition of the English Civil Wars, 45 CHURCH HISTORY 329, 329–30 (1976). 
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in English law and legal theory.
145
 John Adams committed this history to 
text in his written summary of James Otis’ 1761 speech against the Writs 
of Assistance: 
In short, [Otis] asserted these rights [of life, liberty, and property] to 
be derived only from nature and the Author of nature; that they 
were inherent, inalienable, and indefeasible . . . . These principles 
and these rights were wrought into the English constitution as 
fundamental laws. And under this head he went back to the old 
Saxon laws and to Magna Carta . . . to the position of rights and the 
Bill of Rights and the [Glorious] revolution.
146
 
These comparisons involved not only theory, but also practice, as 
constitutional struggles in England tended to have their colonial 
counterparts. Thus, The Trial of the Seven Bishops in England (1688) was 
followed by The Trial of John Peter Zenger in the colonies (1735).
147
 Both 
cases challenged the law of seditious libel as understood in English legal 
precedent, and both outcomes contradicted that precedent by setting new 
parameters for the relationship between the people and the governmental 
authorities. The colonial Writs of Assistance Case (1761), at which John 
“Adams saw the ‘birth of the child Independence,’” raised questions about 
the constitutionality of colonial statutes, and their relationship to English 
law.
148
 James Otis relied upon Lord Coke’s views and the English legal 
precedent in Bonham’s Case (1610) to argue against the Writs, claiming 
that, “when an act of Parliament is against common right or reason . . . the 
Common Law will . . . adjudge such act to be void.”149 He referred to 
former constitutional struggles in England by claiming that the exercise of 
arbitrary power “in former periods of history cost one king of England his 
head and another his throne.”150 Otis stated that the Writs were “the worst 
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and 
the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law-
book.”151 
 
 
 145. This history is summarized well in HALL ET AL., supra note 143 and in STEPHEN B. PRESSER 
& JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (5th ed. 2003).  
 146. James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance (February 1761), NATIONAL HUMANITIES INSTITUTE, 
available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs.htm (last visited May 4, 2015). The portion included 
above is the portion of Otis’s speech that was summarized in the notes of John Adams. 
 147. HALL ET AL., supra note 143, at 6–7, 27–29. 
 148. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 145, at 68. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Otis, supra note 146. 
 151. Id.  
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As these cases demonstrate, the colonists viewed the English law as 
their law, and they felt free to oppose English law on English grounds, 
claiming that the English law was a law of liberty, as opposed to a law of 
tyranny or slavery. They claimed that the English law, itself, was bound by 
a higher law, often articulated by the Founders, like Otis, in language 
similar to that of Blackstone, as the fundamental principles of law. In his 
Commentaries, Blackstone confirmed this hierarchy of law, but qualified 
it, saying, “but if the Parliament will positively enact a thing to be done 
which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it.”152 While 
Blackstone’s views on this matter were dominant in England,153 many of 
the American colonists disagreed. As Jefferson later stated to James 
Madison, the Founders held to Lord Coke’s, not Blackstone’s, 
construction of the relationship between the English law and the higher 
law.
154
 This disagreement regarding the corrective role of the higher law in 
relationship to Parliament was one “which colonial resistance would only 
confirm.”155  
The English Common Law was received in the American colonies 
throughout the eighteenth-century,
156
 and, even as the colonists moved 
toward independence, they continued to describe their rights in terms of 
English law. John Adams summarized some of the key claims of James 
Otis’ February 1761 speech against the Writs of Assistance as follows: 
“He asserted that our ancestors, as British subjects, and we their 
descendants, as British subjects, were entitled to all those rights by the 
British constitution as well as by the law of nature . . . .”157 In his later 
essay, entitled “The Rights of the British Colonies,” James Otis reiterated 
his Writs of Assistance argument by claiming that the law of God was a 
higher authority than Parliament; if a law of Parliament contradicted the 
higher authority, then that law of Parliament was void.
158
 Jefferson 
asserted similar views in “A Summary View of the Rights of British 
America.”159 Both authors framed their arguments in terms of English law. 
 
 
 152. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 145, at 69; LAW, LIBERTY, AND PARLIAMENT: SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 176–77 (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2004) [hereinafter 
LAW, LIBERTY, AND PARLIAMENT]. 
 153. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 145, at 69.  
 154. LAW, LIBERTY, AND PARLIAMENT, supra note 152, at 66. 
 155. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 145, at 69. 
 156. HALL ET AL., supra note 143, at 23–24. 
 157. Otis, supra note 146. The portion here is from John Adams’ summary of Otis’ speech.  
 158. HALL ET AL., supra note 143, at 60–61. 
 159. THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, 103–22 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 16th ed. 1984). 
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Like Otis, Jefferson made the higher law argument, stating that the “God 
who gave us life gave us liberty at the same time . . . .”160  
The English, too, viewed their relationship with the colonies in terms 
of English law, claiming in the 1766 Declaratory Act that both Parliament 
and the Crown ruled colonies.
161
 The colonists responded with the 1774 
Declaration & Resolves of the Continental Congress, claiming their 
entitlement to all English rights, including “life, liberty, and property,”162 
as well as the Common Law of England and the law of the English 
statutes.
163
 These rights were summarized in George Mason’s 1776 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, already written when the Continental 
Congress met to debate and then declare their independence from 
England.
164
 As discussed previously, Mason summarized the colonists’ 
rights as follows: 
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have 
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of 
society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their 
posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means 
of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and 
obtaining happiness and safety.
165
 
Given this extensive reliance on English law and legal theory in the 
Founding Era, the question then becomes, what impact did English legal 
theory have on the Declaration? 
Jefferson, the original drafter of the Declaration, was a self-directed 
student of English history
166
 and had studied English law extensively in his 
training as a lawyer, focusing on Lord Coke’s Institutes and later 
encountering Blackstone’s Commentaries.167 When Jefferson actually sat 
down to write the Declaration, he had two documents with him: his draft 
constitution of Virginia and a draft of George Mason’s Virginia 
Declaration of Rights (1776).
168
 Jefferson’s possession of Mason’s work is 
particularly significant in that, as shown above, Mason’s listing of 
unalienable rights included not only life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
 
 
 160. Id. at 122. 
 161. HALL ET AL., supra note 143, at 63–64. 
 162. Id. at 64. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 69–70. 
 165. Id. at 69 (emphasis added). 
 166. MAIER, supra note 4.  
 167. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A BIOGRAPHY 16–19 
(1970). 
 168. MAIER, supra note 4, at 125–26. 
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happiness, but also property. Mason’s listing suggests that far from 
omitting property and inserting pursuit of happiness in its place, Jefferson 
was following in a tradition that viewed property and pursuit of happiness 
as two distinct rights. 
Pauline Maier, in her 1997 work American Scripture: Making the 
Declaration of Independence, claims that with these two documents in 
mind, Jefferson’s draft of the Declaration, and, indeed, the Declaration as 
a final product, should be seen not primarily as a philosophical document, 
but as “one that concerned the fundamental authority of government.”169 In 
part, she is right. As both Jefferson and Adams claimed, the Declaration 
was not intended to lay out new ideas. The Declaration’s structure shows 
it was intended to make a case for the colonies to separate from rule by 
England and to assume their “separate & equal station” as “free & 
independent states.”170 As Maier argues, these are issues of the 
fundamental authority of government.  
Yet, the language the Founders used to make their case is extremely 
philosophical, and the philosophy that language embodies is, at least in 
part, that of the English Common Law. Thus, the interesting irony of the 
Declaration is that the colonists declared their independence from 
England, but did so in firm reliance and understanding of both the English 
law and the higher law principles which provided the scope and 
framework for the English Common Law system. Only by understanding 
this larger English legal context, a context distilled and then distributed 
throughout the colonies in Blackstone’s Commentaries,171 can we 
understand both the context and the content of the Declaration. 
2. History and Philosophy of Classical Antiquity 
A second strand of thought that influenced the Founders was their 
knowledge of Classical Antiquity. The Founders were deeply steeped in 
the history and philosophy of Classical Antiquity;
172
 such training in the 
 
 
 169. MAIER, supra note 4, at 126.  
 170. WILLS, supra note 10, at 374, 379. 
 171. The Commentaries were published from 1765–1769 and an American edition was published 
as early as 1772. By the time of the Declaration, “nearly twenty-five hundred copies” of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries were circulating in the American colonies, a circulation that is believed to have “rivaled 
that in England.” Julius S. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries, in ESSAYS 
IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 451–54 (David H. Flaherty ed., 1969). 
 172. The Founders were especially familiar with the writings of Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, and 
Epictetus on Stoicism; the writings of Plutarch and Polybius on history; and Joseph Addison’s Cato 
(demonstrating an interplay between Classical Antiquity, Christianity, and English legal theory). See 
generally RICHARD, supra note 139. 
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classics was common among educated men of the time.
173
 They saw the 
ancient Roman Republic as the ideal form of government and they were 
especially familiar with the speeches and writings of the Roman 
philosopher and statesman-orator, Cicero. 
Cicero served as a model for the Founders not only in his promotion of 
mixed government, but also because he consistently (some would say 
incessantly) spoke out against what he perceived to be tyranny and the 
coming downfall of the Roman Republic. He characterized his own fight 
for the preservation of Rome in terms of glory.
174
 Cicero argued that men 
could be motivated to live lives of merit in the face of “toil and danger” 
because of the “praise and glory” that would be their reward: “If you take 
that away, gentlemen, what incentive do we have, in life’s brief and 
transitory career, to involve ourselves in great undertakings?”175  
The Founders frequently characterized their own work in Cicero’s 
terms of great undertakings that would be difficult and involve sacrifice, 
but would lead to glory.
176
 In a reflection of Cicero’s emphasis on glory, 
Jefferson believed one’s public life would be judged by future historians, 
and that one ought to conduct oneself so as to gain esteem in that 
valuation.
177
 Further, the Founders consistently looked to ancient history 
for men like Cicero who could be “models of personal behavior, social 
practice, and government form.”178 For example, Thomas Jefferson saw 
much to admire in Tacitus’ combination of moral and historical 
judgment.
179
 George Washington sought to emulate Cato as he addressed 
his troops.
180
 John Adams attempted to fashion himself after Cicero
181
 as 
an orator-statesman who used an inductive method to determine those 
principles of government which would most lead toward liberty and away 
from tyranny. In an 1809 letter to Benjamin Rush, John Adams claimed 
that, of the men from antiquity who could have served as his model, “I 
chose to confine myself to Cicero.”182 And, indeed, he had. Adams chose 
 
 
 173. PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION, THE RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM 
39 (1967) [hereinafter GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT I]. 
 174. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro Archia (‘For Archias’), in CICERO: DEFENCE SPEECHES 110 (D. 
H. Berry trans., 2000).  
 175. Id. at 120. 
 176. FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS BY DOUGLASS ADAIR 17–29 (Trevor Colbourn 
ed., 1998) [hereinafter FAME]. 
 177. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 54. 
 178. Id. at 53. 
 179. Id. at 53–54. 
 180. Id. at 59–61, 63.  
 181. Id.  
 182. James M. Farrell, “Syren Tully” and the Young John Adams, 87 THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL 
373 (1992) [hereinafter Farrell, Syren Tully]. 
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Cicero for his model early on and held fast to him throughout his 
lifetime.
183
  
The Founders looked to ancient history for models of excellence in 
political and public life; they modeled their own lives on ancient 
standards, and they evaluated the public virtues and political lives of 
others according to those same standards.
184
 Ancient philosophers like 
Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus were important to the Founders 
also due to their emphasis on Stoicism.
185
  
Stoic philosophy emphasized “exceptionless laws” that governed the 
universe. Additionally, Stoic philosophy emphasized the notion that 
“[h]umans should live in accordance with human nature, which is, for 
them, to live in accordance with human reason,” and the idea that “virtue 
is sufficient for happiness;” virtue was defined as “the skill of putting 
other things to their correct use.”186 The Stoic, Chrysippus, summarized it 
as follows:  
Our natures are part of the nature of the universe. Therefore, the 
goal becomes ‘to live following nature’, that is, according to one’s 
own nature and that of the universe, doing nothing which is 
forbidden by the common law (nomos ho koinos), which is right 
reason [orthos logos], penetrating all things . . . .
187
  
For a Stoic, to live the good life or the life of virtue was to live in harmony 
with logos, a form of “universal reason . . . that organizes and directs” the 
natural world
188
 and which was discernable by man through “right 
reason.”189  
 
 
 183. Id. at 373, 376. 
 184. For evaluation based on ancient standards, see RICHARD, supra note 139, at 53–83. 
 185. For more on Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus as followers of Stoicism, see SUSAN SUAVÉ 
MEYER, ANCIENT ETHICS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 134 (2008) and PRIOR, supra note 58, at 208. 
 186. For an overview of these key aspects of Stoicism, see Stoicism, in THE OXFORD CLASSICAL 
DICTIONARY 1446 (Simon Hornblower & Anthony Spawforth eds., 3rd ed. 2003). Aristotle believed 
that to be happy was to live well, and that this was the ultimate end goal of man: “‘. . . for both the 
common run of people and cultivated men call [this “ultimate end of all human activity”] happiness, 
and understand by ‘being happy’ the same as ‘living well’ and ‘doing well.’” PRIOR, supra note 58, at 
149. The Greek word for this conception of happiness is eudaimonia, which is to be distinguished 
from English understandings of happiness: “. . . the English word ‘happiness’ suggests a state of 
psychological contentment, pleasure or joy and, though this subjective component is not absent from 
the Greek eudaimonia, it is not its primary connotation. . . . [Aristotle states that] people understand by 
eudaimonia ‘living well’ and ‘doing well.’” Id. at 149–50.  
 187. MEYER, supra note 185, at 140. 
 188. RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE, INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUE ETHICS: INSIGHTS OF THE ANCIENT 
GREEKS 126–27 (2002).  
 189. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 170, 217–18. To live virtuously was to live in accord with the 
natural law: there is a “prescriptive force of the divine reason that all human beings must follow if they 
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The Founders encountered Stoic philosophy not only through Cicero, 
but also through later Stoics such as Marcus Aurelius and the slave-turned-
philosopher, Epictetus, who was a particular favorite of Jefferson.
190
 
Stoicism was one key line of thought from Classical Antiquity that was 
reflected in the Declaration. A second key line of thought from Classical 
Antiquity that was reflected in the Declaration was the ancient view of 
slavery. 
Slavery was a broader and more fluid concept in the ancient world than 
in the British colonies in North America. In antiquity, slavery was the 
antithesis of freedom and could occur through a variety of means, 
indebtedness and warfare being the greatest two. The ancient Greeks and 
Romans believed an enslaved man was, by the very fact of his 
enslavement, unable to live a virtuous, or rightly ordered, life. Slavery was 
contrary to nature; while a free man could choose to live in harmony with 
his human nature, a slave did not have that choice.
191
 For Epictetus, who 
had been born a slave,
192
 to live in harmony with nature was both the goal 
of one’s life and “‘the virtue of the happy man.’”193 
The Founders consistently employed the classical understanding of 
slavery as the antithesis to liberty in their struggles with Britain. The 
Declaration asserted that the tyranny of the British government threatened 
man’s unalienable rights. These included the colonists’ unalienable right 
to life, which was self-preservation—the first law of nature.194 Liberty, in 
the ancient world, was defined as “the freedoms of the ordinary citizen,” 
including “freedom opposed both to the state of slavery and to domination 
by the powerful;”195 and, finally, the pursuit of happiness. Tyranny is a 
threat to the pursuit of happiness when both tyranny and the pursuit of 
 
 
are to achieve excellence and happiness.” MEYER, supra note 185, at 140. The Stoic notion of virtue 
comports well with Aristotle’s understanding of happiness (eudaimonia) as “living well.” PRIOR, 
supra note 58, at 149–50. 
 190. “Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations and Epictetus’ Discourses and Manual . . . were more 
practically oriented than their predecessors: their major contribution to Stoicism lay in presenting its 
moral philosophy in popular form, rather than in developing its metaphysics and epistemology.” 
PRIOR, supra note 58, at 208. Both Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus furthered “the reorientation toward 
practical ethics.” GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT I, supra note 173, at 165. For Jefferson’s appreciation of 
Epictetus, see Peter S. Onuf, Ancients, Moderns, and the Progress of Mankind, in THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
THE CLASSICAL WORLD, AND EARLY AMERICA 35 (Peter S. Onuf & Nicholas P. Cole eds., 2011). 
 191. MEYER, supra note 185, at 171–73. 
 192. PRIOR, supra note 58, at 208. 
 193. MEYER, supra note 185, at 175. 
 194. “The first law of nature was self-preservation.” PETER S. ONUF, JEFFERSON’S EMPIRE: THE 
LANGUAGE OF AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 94 (2000). 
 195. Libertas, in THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 186, at 854. See also the 
discussion of “classical Latin lībertāt-, lībertās” in the etymology of liberty in the OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, supra note 85 (“liberty, n.1”. OED Online. Sept. 2012).  
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happiness are understood in a classical sense. In the classical sense, to 
pursue happiness is to pursue virtue—to pursue a life that is rightly-
ordered in relation to the first principles, “the law of nature and of nature’s 
God.” And, in the classical sense, this pursuit was not possible among 
those who were enslaved. 
In his “original Rough draught” of the Declaration, Jefferson’s list of 
grievances against the King culminated with a virulent passage against 
slavery.
196
 The charge of slavery was the high point of Jefferson’s 
argument.
197
 This change makes sense when viewed within the overall 
structure of the Declaration. Jefferson’s basic argument is that King 
George III has become a tyrant, and therefore “is unfit to be the ruler of a 
free people.”198 The colonists believed they were enslaved by this tyranny 
and therefore no longer able to exercise their unalienable rights of life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. As a result, the colonists had the right 
to dissolve their government and return to their “separate & equal station” 
in the universe,
199
 where they would no longer be “degrade[ed],” 
“dehumanize[ed],” and “robbed . . . of their virtue.”200 Instead, the 
colonists once more would be at liberty, governed by the law of nature and 
nature’s God, free from the rule of tyranny, and fully able to exercise their 
unalienable rights. 
3. Christianity 
The third strand of thought that influenced the Founders in the 
Revolutionary Era is Christianity. The Founders continually invoked the 
 
 
 196. That passage contained the following charges: “[the King] has waged cruel war against 
human nature itself, violating it’s [sic] most sacred rights of life & liberty in the persons of a distant 
people who never offended him, captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to 
incur miserable death in their transportation thither. this piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel 
powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. determined to keep open a market 
where MEN should be bought & sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative 
attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce: and that this assemblage of horrors might 
want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to 
purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people upon whom he also 
obtruded them; thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with 
crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another.” Thomas Jefferson, Original 
Rough Draft of the Declaration of Independence, 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1760–1776) 
423–428 (1950), available at http://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/jefferson%E2% 
80%99s-%E2%80%9Coriginal-rough-draught%E2%80%9D-declaration-independence (last visited 
May 4, 2015). 
 197. MAIER, supra note 4, at 121. 
 198. The Declaration as included in WILLS, supra note 10, at 377. 
 199. WILLS, supra note 10, at 374 
 200. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 120. 
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Christian God, specifically, or a theistic God, more generally, in their 
Founding Era judicial arguments and opinions, petitions, and declarations 
of rights.
201
 Furthermore, regardless of the personal, religious faith of any 
one Founder, the ideas of Christianity formed a pervasive part of the 
worldview of the Founding Era. For example, Lord Coke and Sir William 
Blackstone both believed Christianity to be the foundation of the English 
Common Law; they discussed it as a fact.
202
 Although later repudiated by 
Jefferson, this belief in the Christian underpinnings of the Common Law 
was widely held by many of the colonists in British North America at the 
time of the Founding.
203
  
The Declaration begins with a discussion of “the laws of nature and of 
nature’s god” and of a Creator who endows individuals with “certain 
inalienable rights.”204 The Declaration’s Creator is in the image of a 
divine clockmaker, who establishes laws to govern his creation. The 
clockmaker analogy is in keeping both with the English deists’ description 
of a “God who had endowed the world at the beginning of time with 
ethical laws that every individual can discover for himself through the use 
of his unaided reason . . .”205 and Blackstone’s description of the 
specifically Christian God, who created natural laws to govern his 
creation.
206
 Although the Declaration’s references to God may appear to 
reflect a more general theism, seemingly general terms such as “Almighty 
God” and “Providence” were specific names for the Christian God, as 
included in the doctrinal teachings of the eighteenth-century Presbyterian 
and Anglican churches in America.
207
  
The Declaration refers to Christianity in other areas as well. In 
language edited in by the Continental Congress, the Founders appeal to 
“the supreme judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions.”208 
 
 
 201. See listing of court cases, petitions, and declarations of rights in PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, 
supra note 145; see generally HALL ET AL., supra note 143. 
 202. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 173. 
 203. Id. at 173–75. 
 204. WILLS, supra note 10, at 374. 
 205. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT I, supra note 173, at 374–75. 
 206. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 38. 
 207. See Westminster Confession, in THE CONSTITUTION AND STANDARDS OF THE ASSOCIATE-
REFORMED CHURCH IN NORTH AMERICA (1799) [hereinafter Westminster Confession]; ARTICLES OF 
THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION (1648); and THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER (1559 and 1662 versions). 
Specifically, Christian language at the Founding was also drawn from the OLD TESTAMENT (especially 
the persistent narrative of slavery in the history of the Israelites) and the NEW TESTAMENT (especially 
the Gospel of St. John, which the Founders were required to translate from the original Greek for 
college entrance exams).  
 208. WILLS, supra note 10, at 379. 
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“Supreme Judge” is a name attributed to the Christian God.209 “Rectitude” 
means rightness, and again invokes the idea of a correct order of things, 
the idea of a fit relationship to one’s world. The Continental Congress also 
added an appeal to “the protection of divine providence.”210 This language 
reflects the Stoic conception of providence as “first cause” and also is seen 
in the Christian conception of Providence as the means by which God 
upholds all things and where God, himself, is defined as “the first 
cause.”211  
To what extent were the Founders familiar with these Christian 
teachings? Although personal religious belief is difficult to determine, 
evidence demonstrates that the Founders were, at the very least, steeped in 
Christianity in an intellectual, academic sense. As part of their college 
entrance requirements, the Founders were required to know Greek, so that 
they could study the New Testament in its original language.
212
 The New 
Testament is replete with language demonstrating a harmony not only 
between the Christian God and the providential first cause of Stoic 
philosophy, but also between the Christian God and the Creator as 
described in the Declaration. For example, in the book of Colossians, St. 
Paul describes a Creator who, like the Creator in the Declaration, governs 
the universe through the law of nature: 
[Christ] is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every 
creature. For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and 
that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or 
dominions, or principalities or powers: all things were created by 
him, and for him: and he is before all things, and by him all things 
consist.
213
 
 
 
 209. Westminster Confession, supra note 207, at 19. The Westminster Assembly was called by 
Parliament and met at Westminster Abbey in London from 1643–1648 to create the Westminster 
Confession of Faith. Westminster Confession, Preface, 3 (1646–1649). Their work culminated in the 
Westminster Confession of Faith. Id. I chose the Westminster Confession for two reasons. First, it was 
created in London at the time of the English constitutional struggles, a time period that the Founders 
continually compared with their own. Second, it was largely adopted by the Presbyterian Church, and 
a large number of Founders were schooled by Scottish Presbyterian tutors, or at the Presbyterian 
College of New Jersey. The College of New Jersey graduated “ten cabinet officers, thirty-nine 
congressmen, twenty-one senators, twelve governors, thirty judges (including three Supreme Court 
justices), and fifty state legislators” under the leadership of President John Witherspoon. RICHARD, 
supra note 139, at 20. 
 210. WILLS, supra note 10, at 379. 
 211. Westminster Confession, supra note 207, at ch. 5. 
 212. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 19. 
 213. Colossians 1:15–17 (King James). 
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This natural law understanding of how the Christian God created and 
ordered the world is evident throughout the New Testament. For example, 
in the book of Romans, St. Paul claims that “since the creation of the 
world [God’s] invisible attributes—His eternal power and divine nature—
have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made 
. . . .”214 Thus, the creation itself testifies to the qualities of the Creator 
God, an idea that later formed the basis for the “nature” book of “two 
book” theology. 
Perhaps the most prominent passage connecting Christianity and 
classical notions of a Creator occurs in the Gospel of St. John, which was 
included in translation requirements for entrance into King’s College (now 
Columbia University), the College of New Jersey (now Princeton), and 
Brown University.
215
 St. John begins his gospel account with these words: 
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and 
the Word was God. He Was with God in the beginning. Through 
him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has 
been made. In him was life, and that life was the light of men.
216
 
In this passage, “the Word” is an English translation of the Greek term 
logos, “the governing power behind all things.”217 St. John uses “the 
Word” as a synonym for Christ, thereby equating Christ with the Greek 
concept of logos: the first mover behind all of creation.  
The early Christians believed that Christ was “the governing power 
behind all things” not only in the created world, but also among mankind. 
Following his discussion of the principles of God made known in the 
created order in Romans 1, St. Paul proclaims that the law of God is 
written on the heart of man and that man’s conscience bears witness to this 
fact.
218
 These passages demonstrate what St. Paul so eloquently 
proclaimed to a group of Stoic and Epicurean philosophers when he met 
with them in Athens. The Greek philosophers saw his words as a “new 
teaching,” but St. Paul proclaimed that his teachings were very old: 
 
 
 214. Romans 1:20. 
 215. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 19. Alexander Hamilton and John Jay went to King’s College, 
which was Anglican. When Jay entered in 1760, he was required to “‘translate the first ten chapters of 
John into Latin.’” RICHARD, supra note 139, at 19. At the time of John Adams’s entrance, Harvard 
required the ability to “‘parse ordinary Greek, as in the New Testament.’” The Presbyterian College of 
New Jersey schooled a disproportionate number of the Founders, and required translation of “‘the 
Greek gospels’” for entrance. Id. 
 216. John 1:1–4. 
 217. Commentary on John 1:1–17 included in HEBREW-GREEK KEY WORD STUDY BIBLE: NEW 
INTERNATIONAL VERSION 1238 (Spiros Zodhiates ed., 1996). 
 218. Romans 2:15b. 
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“[W]hat you worship as something unknown” St. Paul proclaimed, “I am 
going to proclaim to you.”219 St. Paul then defined the Christian God in 
Greek philosophical and intellectual terms, making a case that the Stoic 
first mover, or logos, is actually the Christian God: 
The God who made the world and everything in it is the Lord of 
heaven and earth . . . he himself gives men life and breath and 
everything else . . . he determined the times set for them and the 
exact places where they should live. God did this so that men would 
seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him, though he is 
not far from each one of us. For in him we live and move and have 
our being.’ As some of your own poets have said, ‘We are his 
offspring.’220  
Early Christians such as St. John and St. Paul equated the Stoic logos with 
the Christian God. English legal theorists followed this trend as they 
interpreted the English law through a combination of classical Stoicism 
and Christianity.
221
 Despite the variety of their religious beliefs, it was not 
unusual for the Founders to follow this trend and view classical virtue 
through a Christian lens, as well.
222
 Thus, in the 1760s, Samuel Adams 
described the constitution of England as “founded ‘On the Law of God 
and the Law of Nature,’ as interpreted by Cicero, the Stoics, and James 
Otis.’”223 James Otis, as we saw earlier, adopted Lord Coke’s view that the 
Common Law of England was governed by the higher law of God. His 
intermingling of law, philosophy, and theology is evident in his speech 
against the Writs of Assistance. Otis states that man, outside of society and 
in a state of nature, was “subject to no law but the law written on his 
heart,” a combination of Locke on the state of nature and St. Paul’s 
description of the law of God written on the heart of man.
224
 In language 
reflective of eighteenth-century Anglicanism and the Scottish 
Enlightenment, Otis stated that the law written on the heart of man was 
“revealed to him by his Maker, in the constitution of his nature and the 
inspiration of his understanding and his conscience.”225 With this idea that 
there were interrelated lines of thought in the eighteenth-century that were 
 
 
 219. Acts 17:16–23. 
 220. Acts 17:24–28. 
 221. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 5, 173, 174.  
 222. Id. at 7.  
 223. Id. at 175.  
 224. Otis, supra note 146. The portion here is from John Adams’ notes on Otis’ speech. The “law 
written on his heart” is taken from The Holy Bible, Romans 2:15b. 
 225. Otis, supra note 146. The portion here is from John Adams’ notes on Otis’ speech. 
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then combined in the Declaration, Jefferson agreed, stating of the 
Declaration that “[a]ll its authority rests, then, on the harmonizing 
sentiments of the day . . . .”226  
4. The Scottish Enlightenment’s Focus on Newtonian Science 
In addition to English law and legal theory, the history and philosophy 
of Classical Antiquity, and Christianity, the fourth key strand of thought 
influential in the Founding Era was the Scottish Enlightenment’s focus on 
Newtonian science.
227
 Much has been written on the moral philosophy of 
the Scottish Enlightenment and its impact on the Founding.
228
 The 
Founders imbibed the Scottish Enlightenment philosophy of an ordered 
universe from their Scottish grammar school tutors and through their 
college educations under men like the College of New Jersey’s President, 
John Witherspoon. The Founders did not see in the Scottish Enlightenment 
ideas that they had never before encountered; they saw in the Scottish 
Enlightenment ideas with which they were already intimately familiar.
229
 
From their grammar school days under Scottish tutors through their 
college studies of the classics, the New Testament, and moral and political 
philosophy, the Founders had become familiar with a combination of 
English liberty, Classical history and philosophy, and Christianity that 
they did not believe to be inconsistent. The Founders saw one tradition of 
liberty, tracing from antiquity to England to America, and it was a 
tradition that combined both classical and Common Law understandings 
of that term.
230
 Thus, the Scottish Enlightenment revitalized ideas already 
held by the Founders.  
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the Scottish Enlightenment 
to Founding Era thought came through the Scottish Enlightenment’s 
Common Sense school, which harmonized philosophy and Newtonian 
science. As discussed previously, the Common Sense school held to the 
idea that one could induce first principles through observation of nature, 
 
 
 226. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 175.  
 227. See Garry Wills on the pursuit of happiness and public virtue (WILLS, supra note 10) and 
Isaac Kramnick’s essay differentiating Scottish Enlightenment thinking from “Lockean liberalism or 
neo-classical republicanism.” Isaac Kramnick, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 90 (Jack P. Greene & J.R. Pole eds., 1991). 
 228. In addition to WILLS, supra note 10, see Jan Lewis, Happiness, in THE BLACKWELL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 643–45 (Jack P. Greene & J.R. Pole eds., 1991) and 
Kramnick, supra note 227, at 90. 
 229. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 182.  
 230. See generally RICHARD, supra note 139. 
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an epistemology or way of knowing that mirrored the previous work of 
English scientist Sir Isaac Newton.  
Newton made use of the scientific method to explore the natural world 
and, in 1687, he published his work on the history of science, 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.
231
 That Jefferson thought 
much of Newton’s methods and conclusions is demonstrated in his 
inclusion of Newton in his “noble trinity” of great men: Francis Bacon, Sir 
Isaac Newton, and John Locke.
232
 In fact, each of these three thinkers 
spoke in ways that reflected the Scottish Enlightenment’s “Common 
Sense” method of induction from first principles.  
Newton believed the laws of nature could be determined through 
observation, and that such observations ought to be the starting point of 
philosophy.
233
 His method was inquiry, guided by reason,
234
 and his object 
was “the discovery of the natural order of things.”235 Newton believed that 
there was an order to the created world and that happiness consisted in 
living in accordance with that order,
236
 a belief that is in tandem with the 
classical and Christian understanding of the law of nature and of nature’s 
god. Indeed, Newton was a lifelong scholar of both the classics and the 
Bible, convinced of a harmony between science and religion.
237
 Newton 
saw the wisdom of God as he studied the natural world, and the principles 
 
 
 231. I. BERNARD COHEN & RICHARD S. WESTFALL, Newton xiii (1995). 
 232. PETERSON, supra note 167, at 386. See also GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT II, supra note 112, 
at 559–60. In his esteem of Bacon, Newton, and Locke, Jefferson was not alone. Bacon, Newton, and 
Locke have been described as “patron saints” of the Enlightenment. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT I, 
supra note 173, at 11–12. Like Newton, Bacon called for a “‘more perfect use of reason in the 
investigation of Nature.’” Tumbleson, Reason and Religion, supra note 69, at 134. Locke argued for 
man’s ability to “discover” the law of nature, which he described as “law enacted by a superior power 
and implanted in our hearts” and as “the decree of the divine will discernible by the light of nature and 
indicating what is and what is not in conformity with rational nature, and for this very reason 
commanding or prohibiting” (JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 111 (Wolfgang von 
Leyden ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1663–1664)). Locke argued that “‘The Law of Nature stands as 
an Eternal Rule to all Men, legislators as well as others.’” (RICHARD, supra note 139, at 174) and that 
“God had harmonized the physical and the moral worlds such that the true and knowable causes of 
True and Enduring human happiness are identical to virtue.” See Kors, “The Pursuit of Happiness,” 
supra note 65. Thus, in pursuing happiness, one could gain knowledge of the self-evident principles 
that formed “the most simple laws of nature” (Jacob & Jacob, supra note 64, at 264) that would lead to 
virtue, or a human life that was rightly ordered within the natural law. Locke’s argument reflects not 
only his understanding of the interrelationship of reason and revelation, but also his “decisive 
repudiation” of the Scholastics in favor of a Common Sense epistemology. GAY, THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT I, supra note 173, at 320–21. 
 233. Jacob & Jacob, supra note 64, at 264. 
 234. PETERSON, supra note 167, at 47.  
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 48. 
 237. COHEN & WESTFALL, supra note 231, at 360. 
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he discovered in his scientific explorations led him to look on Creation 
with a sense of awe.
238
  
Newton is best known for his contributions to science and 
mathematics. He has not been fully recognized for the manner in which his 
scientific theories of an ordered universe provided a model that “exalted a 
divine Creator [and] gave assurance that the laws of nature were universal, 
harmonious, and beneficent.”239 Jefferson had Newton’s portrait on 
display in his study
240
 and, in keeping with Newton’s philosophy, 
Jefferson believed that “all things work by the laws of Nature and Nature’s 
God.”241 Jefferson believed that Newton’s “empirical science” was 
adaptable not only to the physical sciences, but also “in all fields, the 
moral and social together with the physical.”242 Men like John Adams 
applied Newton’s science to the study of political science, as well.243 The 
Founders believed that, just as there existed laws of nature to direct the 
natural world, so did there exist laws of nature to direct proper 
governance. Both John Adams and James Madison believed that good 
government could be secured by determining the principles that would 
encourage government to operate as it was intended to operate. Both men 
conducted intensive historical studies of governments in order to identify 
these principles and apply them to the new government of the United 
States.
244
  
C. Intermingling of the Four Strands 
As the philosophes of the English Enlightenment surveyed the 
struggles between the American colonies and England in the years leading 
up to and following to the American Revolution, they did so with hope 
that the “practical science” of freedom “might be realized” in America.245 
As they observed the American Revolution and the Founding of the new 
 
 
 238. Id. at 358–60. 
 239. PETERSON, supra note 167, at 47. 
 240. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT II, supra note 112, at 129–30.  
 241. WILLS, supra note 10, at 365–66. 
 242. PETERSON, supra note 167, at 47. 
 243. For a discussion of John Adams’s application of Newton’s scientific methods to the field of 
political science, see John E. Paynter, The Rhetorical Design of John Adams’s “Defence of the 
Constitutions of . . . America”, 58 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 531 (1996).  
 244. John Adams compiled key principles of governance in A Defence of the Constitutions of the 
United States (see ADAMS, infra note 282) while James Madison’s study of the principles of 
government are contained in his “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies” and “Vices of the 
Political System of the United States.” FAME, supra note 176, at 158–60, 191–92. See also COHEN, 
SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS, supra note 49, at 227–30, 237–38, 257–62. 
 245. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT II, supra note 112, at 555.  
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American republic from across the Atlantic, the European Enlightenment 
thinkers began to describe America as “‘the hope of the human race’” and 
“‘its model.’”246 They applauded American practicality and, especially, 
what they perceived to be the full embodiment of liberty on American 
soil.
247
 To the Europeans who looked on, America was the new ideal in 
liberty and the best example yet of “the program of enlightenment in 
practice.”248 
That key figures of the Enlightenment would feel such hope and joy at 
the progress of the American colonies—now the new United States—is 
the flip side of the American Enlightenment’s own mid-eighteenth century 
reverence for its French and English counterparts.
249
 Americans adapted 
Enlightenment thinking to their own situation.
250
 As a result, when the 
Americans ultimately decided to split from England, they did so with an 
understanding that they were furthering, not hindering, the great English 
tradition of liberty.  
In arguing for their cause, the Founders intermingled in their rhetoric 
the key intellectual strands of the European Enlightenment.
251
 The 
Founders believed that ancient law and philosophy were expressed within 
the English Common Law and would be perfected by the new United 
States. They understood Christianity as the foundation of the Common 
Law and the fulfillment of ancient ideals, as seen in St. John’s claim in the 
New Testament Gospel of John that Christ is logos, the first-mover of 
Stoicism, and St. Paul’s claim in the book of Acts that the Christian God 
fulfills the pagan philosophy and religion of the ancient world.
252
 Men like 
Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, and their contemporaries “invoked heroes of 
antique and modern times . . . with the ease of educated men knowing that 
they have an educated audience.”253 Perhaps the most intriguing example 
of this intermingling of ideas is to be found in Joseph Addison’s popular 
 
 
 246. Id. at 556.  
 247. Id. at 555–58.  
 248. Id. at 558.  
 249. Id. at 558–59.  
 250. Id.  
 251. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 81–83; GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT II, supra note 112, at 561. 
Richard demonstrates the intermingling of these four ideas at the Founding. My work differs by 
focusing on the point where these ideas converge, and then by exploring what this point of 
convergence tells us about the structure, purpose, and meaning of the Declaration of Independence, 
generally, and the pursuit of happiness, more specifically. 
 252. For John’s description of Christ as Logos, see Commentary on John 1: 1–17 in THE 
HEBREW-GREEK KEY WORD STUDY BIBLE, supra note 217, at 1238. For Paul’s claims in Acts, see 
Acts 17:16–28. 
 253. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT II, supra note 112, at 562–63.  
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eighteenth-century play, Cato, which intertwined Christianity, classical 
history and philosophy, and English legal theory.
254
  
Like so many of his contemporaries, Addison believed that he could 
know his present day more fully if he studied the ancient past, as 
embodied in the classics.
255
 His play is based on the life of Marcus Portius 
Cato, a virtuous leader in the Roman Republic whose life was chronicled 
in Plutarch’s Moral Lives, a favorite read of the Founders. However, the 
play Cato differed from its Plutarchian roots in that it mixed elements of 
Christianity and Classical Antiquity in a way that assumed their 
interrelationship and their applicability to the colonists’ struggle against 
England. In Cato’s struggle against the corrupt tyranny of Julius Caesar 
(one of the Founders’ chief classical villains) the Founders saw their own 
struggle against the corrupt tyranny of King George III.
256
 The play was 
immensely popular in the Revolutionary Era, and George Washington 
even ordered a production of it at Valley Forge to motivate his troops to 
fight to overthrow English tyranny.
257
 In Addison’s Cato, the Founders’ 
philosophical intermingling of Christianity, Classical Antiquity, and 
English legal theory found practical expression.
258
  
Like Addison’s Cato, Blackstone’s Commentaries, the key colonial 
text on English law,
259
 also embodied Christianity, Classical Antiquity, 
and English history and legal theory. Blackstone’s Commentaries had its 
roots in England and was a response to Rome. It began with a conception 
of natural law that was both Stoic and Christian. While Founders like 
James Wilson disagreed with Blackstone’s belief that Parliament remained 
a supreme authority over the colonies,
260
 they did not throw him out as a 
whole. Instead, they disagreed with Blackstone on that point, and used his 
own words to show that he was wrong, stating that the authority of 
 
 
 254. For a description of Cato and its impact on George Washington and the Founders, see 
RICHARD, supra note 139, at 57–60.  
 255. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT I, supra note 173, at 41. 
 256. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 57–58.  
 257. Id. at 58.  
 258. Id. at 57–58.; FAME, supra note 176, at 17, 404. 
 259. “‘The Commentaries served as the principal means of the colonists’ information as to the 
state of English law in general.’” Waterman, supra note 171, at 454, citing THEODORE F. T. 
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 207 (1929). The commentaries “became at 
once the standard authority upon law in every American court, and especially in the great number of 
small courts of original common-law jurisdiction. . . . The effect was, that upon all questions, of 
private law at least, this work stood for the law itself throughout the country, and at least for a 
generation to come exercised an influence upon the jurisprudence of the new nation, which no other 
work has enjoyed, and to which no other work can possibly now obtain.” Waterman, supra note 171, 
at 454, citing 1 Hammond “Blackstone” (1890) p. ix.  
 260. BECKER, supra note 4, at 107. 
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Parliament was inferior to that of the higher law because, in the words of 
Blackstone, the colonists were first and foremost obliged to obey “the law 
of nature [which] is superior in obligation to any other.”261  
The Founders also looked to English history for the story of their own 
origins.
262
 They revered King Alfred and what they believed to be a 
“golden age” of Saxon liberty.263 During the American Revolution, 
colonists upheld King Alfred as the symbol of the liberty for which they 
fought, going so far as to rename the leading American warship in 
Alfred’s name.264  
The men who drafted the Declaration blended these four strands of 
thought in their personal philosophies, as well.
265
 Thomas Jefferson drew 
up the first draft of the Declaration and then sent it to John Adams and 
Benjamin Franklin for review. Jefferson had made a careful study of 
English law.
266
 However, he was no fan of William Blackstone, labeling 
him a “honeyed” Tory and preferring the works of Lord Coke, which he 
believed to be more challenging.
267
 Yet, he “was European to the bone,” 
drawing ideas from both England and France.
268
 Jefferson read Anglo-
Saxon history and law codes enthusiastically, looking to Anglo-Saxon 
precedents for his views on religious freedom and governance.
269
 In 
contemplating the Great Seal of the United States, Jefferson went so far as 
to suggest that it should bear the portraits of “the first Anglo-Saxon kings, 
‘from whom we claim the honor of being descended, and whose political 
principles and form of government we have assumed.’”270 Like 
Blackstone, Jefferson looked to the Anglo-Saxon legal principles as a 
foundation and advocated for a “‘restitution of the ancient Saxon laws.’”271 
Jefferson also was a skilled classicist, both self-taught and trained by 
the Reverend James Maury, where he read in the original Greek and 
 
 
 261. Id. at 109. 
 262. TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 227 (1998).  
 263. Id. at 227. 
 264. HORSPOOL, supra note 97, at 170. 
 265. The following discussion builds upon a brief intellectual history of John Adams, Benjamin 
Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson in RICHARD, supra note 139, at 169–95.  
 266. MAIER, supra note 4, at 125. 
 267. PETERSON, supra note 167, at 15–18. 
 268. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT II, supra note 112, at 559.  
 269. HORSPOOL, supra note 97, at 170; COLBOURN, supra note 262, at 208–09. Colbourn is 
quoting Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Aug. 14, 1776), in FAMILIAR LETTERS OF JOHN 
ADAMS 211 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1876). 
 270. HORSPOOL, supra note 97, at 170. 
 271. Id. 
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Latin,
272
 and by George Wythe at The College of William and Mary.
273
 
Jefferson greatly admired the Stoic philosopher Epictetus and was a 
proponent of the scientific ideals of the Scottish Enlightenment, perhaps 
due to his studies under William Small, who taught Jefferson math and 
science, including Newtonian scientific theory and the mathematical order 
of the universe.
274
 Jefferson included both Wythe and Small among the 
three contemporary men who had had the greatest influence on him 
(Peyton Randolph being the third).
275
 Jefferson’s views on Christianity 
seem to have changed over his lifetime and were enigmatic, at best,
276
 but 
he remained consistent in his admiration of Christ as a moral teacher.  
John Adams used explicitly Christian language in his writings and was 
a skilled classicist and English constitutional scholar.
277
 In his early years, 
Adams consciously adopted Cicero’s own philosophy of service in the 
study and practice of law,
278
 which he articulated as “to procure Redress of 
Wrongs, the Advancement of Right, to assert and maintain Liberty and 
Virtue, to discourage and abolish Tyranny and Vice.”279  
In later years, Adams combined political theories from English law and 
classical thought and inductive science from the Scottish Enlightenment in 
his exploration of the principles of government. He relied upon 
Enlightenment thinkers in his arguments.
280
 Adams, like his fellow 
Englishmen before him, believed in a westward movement of empire—
from Greece and Rome, to France and Great Britain; and he distinguished 
himself from his former countrymen with his belief that this westward 
empire, and the liberty it embodied, would be received, and perfected in, 
the new United States.
281
 Through A Defence, he argued that a modified 
Roman Republican mixed government structure provided the best model 
upon which to base that perfection.
282
 “‘Liberty,’ he said, ‘depends upon 
 
 
 272. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT I, supra note 173, at 55. 
 273. PETERSON, supra note 167, at 13; RICHARD, supra note 139, at 22, 36.  
 274. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 181.  
 275. PETERSON, supra note 167, at 15. 
 276. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 188–94.  
 277. Id. at 30–31, 194, 132–33.  
 278. Farrell, Syren Tully, supra note 182, at 378, 388. 
 279. Id. at 388. 
 280. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT II, supra note 112, at 559.  
 281. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 78.  
 282. See especially Adams’s discussion of mixed government and its perfection as it moves from 
Rome to Great Britain to the constitutions of the new United States in Letter XXX of John Adams, A 
Defence of the Constitutions of the United States (Da Capo Press reprint ed.) (1787–88), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/jadams/ja1_00.htm. (last visited May 4, 2015). 
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an exact Ballance, a nice Counterpoise of all the Powers of the state. . . . 
The best Governments of the World have been mixed.’”283  
With this in mind, Adams considered how the corruptions of the 
English constitution could be improved and perfected by applying 
elements from “[t]he best Governments of the World” in the new United 
States. In an early form of political science, Adams applied Newtonian 
principles of empirical study to his search for the natural principles or laws 
of good governments.
284
 He used history as a laboratory, looking to past 
experience for evidence that he could apply to new experiments.
285
 In so 
doing, he made use of the ancient rhetorical device of induction, one of the 
key rhetorical strategies outlined by Cicero in De Inventione, the Scottish 
Enlightenment’s focus on inductive reasoning, and the Stoic and Christian 
ideal of finding natural principles, known as “exceptionless laws” or the 
“law of nature and of nature’s God” that govern the natural order of 
things.
286
  
Benjamin Franklin is perhaps the most interesting. He developed a 
reputation first as a scientist and then as a philosophe.
287
 He studied Joseph 
Addison’s Spectator and Newtonian science.288 He corresponded heavily 
with the scientists of the Scottish Enlightenment
289
 and is well-known for 
his scientific experiments and inventions. He was not trained in English 
law, but, prior to the Declaration, conducted a significant study of “all that 
had been written, pro and con, about the respective rights and prerogatives 
of British and colonial legislatures.”290 While Franklin and Adams 
disagreed on the best form of government, Franklin shared Adam’s 
methodology; prior to the Constitutional Convention, Franklin hosted “the 
Society for Political Enquires,” which met weekly to study the science of 
 
 
 283. JOHN ADAMS, Notes for an Oration at Braintree, in DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY 2:57–60 
(1772), quoted in GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICANIZATION OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 165 (2004). 
 284. For a discussion of John Adams’s application of Newton’s scientific methods to the field of 
political science, see Paynter, supra note 243.  
 285. Paynter, supra note 243, at 558. 
 286. For induction, see Kennedy, 136; MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE INVENTIONE 31–32 (Charles 
Duke Yonge trans., George Bell & Sons 1888), available at http://www.classicpersuasion.org/pw/ 
cicero/dnvindex.htm (last visited May 4, 2015). For natural principles, see Marcus Tullius Cicero, In 
Defence of Titus Annius Milo, in SELECTED POLITICAL SPEECHES OF CICERO 215–78, 266 (Michael 
Grant trans., 1969); CICERO, On the State, in ON GOVERNMENT 172–74, 183 (Michael Grant trans., 
1993). For more on the Stoic idea of natural principles or exceptionless laws, Stoicism, in THE 
OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 186, at 1446. 
 287. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT I, supra note 173, at 14. For David Hume’s appreciation of 
Franklin, see GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT II, supra note 112, at 558–59.  
 288. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT II, supra note 112, at 559.  
 289. WILLS, supra note 10, at 99–100. 
 290. BECKER, supra note 4, at 101. 
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political life.
291
 Franklin’s influence in the natural and political sciences 
were evident in the years leading up to the American Revolution. He 
visited France repeatedly, and the French so admired Franklin as a 
scientist and a philosophe that they elected him, in 1772, to the French 
Royal Academy of Science.
292
  
Although Franklin only received two years of formal education, he was 
a voracious reader across many genres, including Plutarch’s Lives and 
Joseph Addison’s Spectator papers, which Franklin saw as “a tool for self-
improvement.”293 He taught himself to read in several languages, including 
Latin and French.
294
 Franklin was adamantly opposed to classical 
education, but enjoyed reading the classical authors in translation,
295
 and 
voiced his intention to include “‘a Latin motto, which carries a charm in it 
to the Vulgar, and the Learned admire the pleasure of construing’” in each 
edition of his newspaper, the New England Courant.
296
  
Franklin may not have believed in the divinity of Christ, but he 
supported Christ’s moral teachings.297 In his Autobiography, he included a 
discussion of his earlier call for a “‘united Party for Virtue’” and his 
proposed creed for such a party gives us some insight into his religious 
beliefs:  
the belief that there was ‘one God’ who ‘governs the World by his 
Providence’; that the way to serve God was to do good to man; that 
‘the Soul is immortal’; and ‘that God would certainly reward Virtue 
and punish Vice either here or hereafter.’298  
When asked about his religious views in 1790, Franklin answered in 
language similar to the Creed he had proposed earlier when he stated “he 
believed  
‘in One God, Creator of the Universe. That He governs it by his 
Providence. That he ought to be worshipped. That the most 
acceptable Service we can render to him, is doing Good to his other 
 
 
 291. WOOD, supra note 283, at 164–66, 215–16. 
 292. Id. at 172 (citing ALFRED OWEN ALDRIDGE, FRANKLIN AND HIS FRENCH CONTEMPORARIES 
26 (1957)). 
 293. Id. at 18–19. 
 294. Id. at 56. 
 295. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 196–98, 203–04. 
 296. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT I, supra note 173, at 40. 
 297. RICHARD, supra note 139, at 194. 
 298. WOOD, supra note 283, at 225 (quoting THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 
161–62 (Leonard Labaree et al. eds., 1964)). 
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Children. That the Soul of Man is immortal, and will be treated with 
Justice in another Life respecting its Conduct in this.’299  
Franklin’s views of Jesus mirrored those of Jefferson, and he stated that he 
“believed Jesus’s ‘System of Morals and his Religion as he left them to us, 
the best the World ever saw, or is likely to see.’”300 
Despite the variance within and between the philosophies of these three 
men (and there are many), not one of these men altered the pursuit of 
happiness as an unalienable right when they edited the initial draft of the 
Declaration. This lack of editing suggests not only that the Founders 
intermingled these four strands in their Founding Era thought, but also that 
these four strands specifically converged in such a way as to give meaning 
to the phrase “pursuit of happiness”—a meaning that was obvious and 
acceptable to all three of them. It is William Blackstone’s discussion of the 
phrase “pursuit of happiness” that best fits this definition. 
D. Convergence of the Four Strands: the Pursuit of Happiness 
Blackstone was the most widely-read English jurist in the 
Revolutionary Era.
301
 It follows that Blackstone’s ideas would inform the 
colonists’ Declaration, the foundation of which was English law. And, 
indeed, it does.
302
 But the Declaration is best understood as Blackstone 
 
 
 299. WOOD, supra note 283, at 229 (quoting Franklin’s response to Ezra Stiles’ letter of March 
1790).  
 300. Id. 
 301. Waterman, supra note 171, at 451–57.  
 302. “‘Paradoxically, those same Commentaries furnished to the American Colonies a most 
effective weapon in their revolution against the mother country. . . . The philosophy of the Declaration 
of Independence usually is ascribed to Locke and Paine. But it appears to me that one may clearly 
trace the influence of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the mind of Jefferson, in the affirmations of the 
Declaration that all men are born with certain unalienable rights. . . . The counts in the indictment of 
George the Third, contained in the Declaration of Independence, in the main are sustained by 
Blackstone’s description of the rights of Englishmen and the principles of the British Constitution. . . . 
Little did the Great Commentator realize when he read his lectures to a polite and scholarly audience at 
Oxford of the weapon he unwittingly was forging for the Colonists in North America.’” Waterman, 
supra note 171, at 455–56 (quoting Wickersham Presentation Address of Blackstone Memorial 10 
A.B.A. Jour. 576–78 (1924). As Waterman points out, it seems that the colonists were influenced by 
“‘the law of nature’ and ‘natural rights’ . . . concepts which were so current at the time” and while they 
agreed with Blackstone’s statement of “a fundamental law of nature which is superior to human law,” 
they strongly disagreed with Blackstone that such rights could be “subject to the supreme power which 
Blackstone said existed in every government.” Waterman, supra note 171, at 479, 478 (citing Haines, 
“Revival of Natural Law Concepts” 54, 56 (1930) and Wilson “Works” 206 (Vol. III, 1804). The 
former ideas are Whiggish in nature; the latter are Tory. Indeed, later in life, Jefferson decried 
Blackstone as a Tory and took pains to emphasize that it was Coke on Littleton, and not the “honied 
Mansfieldism of Blackstone” that “was the universal elementary book of law students, and a sounder 
whig never wrote, nor of profounder learning in the orthodox doctrines of the British constitution, or in 
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mediated by the Founders’ understandings not only of English law and 
legal theory, but also of the Classics, and of Christianity, and of 
Newtonian science. The most fascinating thing about these four strands of 
thought is not where they diverge, but where they converge. If we remove 
the first mover in each strand of thought (nature for the Newtonian 
scientists; God for Christianity; God and the King for the English 
Common Law; and logos for the Stoics), all four strands of thought posit a 
world governed by laws of nature in which to live rightly or virtuously is 
to live in accordance with that law. And, in each line of thought, to live in 
accordance with the law of nature is to be happy, as understood in the 
Greek sense of eudaimonia, translated to the English as flourishing or 
well-being.  
Thus, all four lines of thought are in harmony with Jefferson’s use of 
pursuit of happiness and Blackstone’s explanation of that phrase in his 
Commentaries. Jefferson may not have looked to Blackstone to define the 
phrase pursuit of happiness, but Blackstone seems to have best articulated 
the phrase’s meaning as it was widely-understood within the four 
ideological strands present at the time of the Founding. The convergence 
of these four strands meant that Founders with very different personal and 
political philosophies nevertheless could affirm the language of the 
Declaration because the language chosen reflected the commonalities 
among the four strands. 
Looking at the pursuit of happiness in its historical context tells us 
quite a bit about the meaning of the phrase. It also tells us quite a bit about 
Founding Era thought. In contrast to recent historiography asserting that 
the Declaration reflects either a single ideological strand or several, 
distinct ideological strands, one of which clearly trumps,
303
 this study 
suggests that the Founders drew from a variety of intellectual inspirations, 
combining them in ways that are sometimes incoherent to us. This 
incoherency, as we see it today, may lead us to determine that the 
Founders saw incoherency as well.  
However, a contextual study of the pursuit of happiness reveals that the 
Founders saw a convergence of ideas that conveyed substantive meaning. 
When these ideas are explored together, they reveal what Jefferson 
described as the “harmonization of the ideas of the day,” as embodied in 
 
 
what were called English liberties.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (1826) included 
in Waterman, supra note 171, at 459 (quoting from a letter in THOMAS JEFFERSON, The Works of 
Thomas Jefferson 456 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1930)). 
 303. See generally BAILYN, supra note 139; Lewis, supra note 228; RICHARD, supra note 139; 
SCOTT, supra note 6; WILLS, supra note 10. 
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eighteenth-century thinking about English law and legal theory; 
Christianity; the history and philosophy of Classical Antiquity; and the 
Scottish Enlightenment’s focus on Newtonian Science. Studying the 
pursuit of happiness in context suggests that Blackstone and the Founders 
agreed on much about the nature of law and jurisprudence, even as they 
disagreed about the right of a people to overthrow a government that they 
believe has become tyrannical. The Founders viewed happiness as 
eudaimonia and the pursuit of happiness as both a private right and a 
public duty.  
III. THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS:A PRIVATE RIGHT AND A PUBLIC DUTY 
A. Blackstone and the Founders: A Single Definition 
Eighteenth-century dictionaries state that to be happy is to be lucky or 
fortunate, or to be in a state of felicity.
304
 The former meaning stems from 
a fourteenth-century meaning of the word, with the root word “hap” 
meaning “by chance or accident.”305 The latter meaning demonstrates how 
the meaning of “happy” changed over time so that, by the eighteenth 
century, its primary definition came to mean “a state of felicity” or “very 
glad” or “pleased and content.”306 By the early 1700s, the definition also 
came to include the synonym “blessed” defined as “to wish success to;” 
“to consecrate to God;” and “to make happy.”307 
At first glance, it would seem that the idea of happiness as felicity 
supports the notion of the pursuit of happiness as the unalienable right to 
do that which makes one feel good. But happiness as it was used in the 
natural, moral, and legal philosophy of the eighteenth-century embodied 
not only an understanding of “happy” as very glad, pleased, and content, 
but also an understanding of that which had the capability of making one 
very glad, pleased, and content in the truest sense of the words. 
Enlightenment thinkers contrasted “fleeting and temporal” happiness with 
 
 
 304. JOHN KERSEY, Happy, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1702) (Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online). “Happy” in JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 965; JAMES BUCHANAN, Happy, A 
NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1769) (Eighteenth Century Collections Online); JOHN WALKER, Happy, 
A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY AND EXPOSITOR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1797) 
(Eighteenth Century Collections Online); CALEB ALEXANDER, Happy, THE COLUMBIAN DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1800) (Eighteenth Century Collections Online). 
 305. DOUGLAS HARPER, Happy, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline. 
com/index.php?term=hap (last visited May 4, 2015). 
 306. Id. 
 307. KERSEY, supra note 304, “happy” and “to bless,” defined as “to make happy”; BUCHANAN, 
supra note 304, “happy” and “bless.” 
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“real and substantial” happiness, and borrowed from ancient thinkers to 
argue that true happiness—real and substantial happiness—came from 
living a life of virtue, a life that was fit or rightly-ordered in relation to the 
natural law. In other words, Enlightenment thinkers understood true 
happiness in the ancient sense of eudaimonia, or human flourishing, which 
was to be achieved through a life of virtue, and which had both private 
(pertaining to an individual person) and public (pertaining to the 
community) applications.   
B. The Commentaries and the Declaration: Dual Applications 
The pursuit of happiness is first discussed in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries in its individual application—it is the way of knowing the 
law of nature that the Creator has built into each man, and it is by each 
man’s free will that he then can choose to live in harmony with that law. 
The Declaration also discusses the pursuit of happiness in its individual 
application when it lists the pursuit of happiness among man’s unalienable 
rights—those rights that are so important that we obtain them simply by 
being human and that are so essential to our humanity that we cannot 
alienate them from our persons. In its inclusion of the pursuit of happiness 
as one of the unalienable rights bestowed upon man by his Creator, the 
Declaration emphasizes the individual-right application of the phrase. 
While the Declaration’s emphasis is on the pursuit of happiness as an 
individual, unalienable right, this is not to say that the Declaration is void 
of the public duty implications of the phrase. The Founders argued, in 
language that is remarkably reflective of Blackstone’s architectural 
analogies, that when a government ceases to protect man’s unalienable 
rights,  
it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and 
organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to affect their Safety and Happiness. 
With this passage they led into King George III’s “train of abuses,” 
describing him as “a Tyrant . . . unfit to be the ruler of a free people.” To 
be unfit was to be the opposite of virtuous; it was to be no longer capable 
of affecting the safety and happiness of the people.  
The Founders argued for separation from England because King 
George III was no longer fit to govern a free people, so it is perhaps ironic 
that the idea of instructing future lawmakers in principles of good or fit 
government was a focal point of the Introduction to Blackstone’s 
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Commentaries. Blackstone’s understanding of the pursuit of happiness as 
an individual route to one’s public duty to improve and perfect the 
Common Law was articulated in his Commentaries, but it was first 
expressed in this portion of his poem, “The Lawyer’s Farewell to His 
Muse,” which Blackstone wrote as he began his legal studies:308 
In furs and coifs around me stand;    
With sounds uncouth and accents dry 
That grate the soul of harmony,    
Each pedant sage unlocks his store       
Of mystic, dark, discordant lore; 
And points with tott’ring hand the ways 
That lead me to the thorny maze. (ll. 49-57)
309
  
First, Blackstone describes the study of law as something that “grate[s] the 
soul of harmony” and is handed down by “pedant sages.” While “sage” is 
a complimentary term, referring to “a philosopher; a man of gravity and 
wisdom,”310 the addition of “pedant” alters the definition completely, and 
shows Blackstone’s impatience with law teachers, pedants who were 
“[men] vain of low knowledge.”311 To remedy this lack, Blackstone urged 
those studying the law to pursue that which is fit and rightly-ordered, or, 
as he described it, “one great end.”312 
In that pure spring the bottom view 
Clear, deep, and regularly true, 
And other doctrines thence imbibe 
Than lurk within the sordid scribe;  
Observe how parts with parts unite 
In one harmonious rule of right;  
 
 
 308. PREST, supra note 108, at 58. 
 309. Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
 310. “Sage” in JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1740.  
 311. “Pedant” in JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1471. In his dictionary, Samuel 
Johnson specifically tied pedantry back to university education, including with his definition of 
pedantry this quotation from Jonathan Swift: “From the universities the young nobility are sent for fear 
of contracting any airs of pedantry by a college education.” “Pedantry” in JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, 
supra note 19, at 1472. 
 312. PREST, supra note 108, at 59. 
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See countless wheels distinctly tend 
By various laws to one great end;  
While mighty Alfred’s piercing soul 
Pervades, and regulates the whole. 
These lines foreshadow the Common Sense methodology that Blackstone 
would adopt in undertaking that quest. A view that is “clear, deep, and 
regularly true” indicates that which can be readily observed, and truths that 
can be known through observation. The idea of parts uniting “in one 
harmonious rule of right” is a foreshadowing of his Newtonian 
understanding that all human law ought to be in harmony with that one 
rule of right ordained in God by man, which is the pursuit of happiness. 
Blackstone evokes Newton again with the scientific imagery of “countless 
wheels,” an image that calls to mind the Creator God who designs the 
world as a clockmaker designs a clock, an analogy which Blackstone later 
includes in his Commentaries. He refers to the whole of these parts 
together as “one great end.” Finally, Blackstone already is looking to King 
Alfred as his ancient Anglo-Saxon predecessor, the one whose “soul,” 
which sought wisdom above all, “pervades, and regulates the whole” with 
“the whole” presumably being the whole of the English Common Law.313  
Blackstone argued for the pursuit of happiness as a science of 
jurisprudence that would help man discern the “one harmonious rule of 
right.” Just as individuals could determine the law of nature as it pertains 
to man by consulting what makes them truly and substantially happy, so, 
too, could judges, jurors, and MPs use that same science of jurisprudence 
to fulfill their public duty, which was to improve the Common Law, 
perfecting it as the foundation of a good or fit government.  
That the Founders agreed is evidenced by their own writings. The 
Founders affirmed the pursuit of happiness as an individual, unalienable 
right in the Declaration. They also appealed to the necessity of a happy 
(fit, virtuous) form of government, as well as a government that would 
affect the happiness of the people, a theme they had previously articulated 
in the Resolutions of the Continental Congress (1765), the Declaration 
and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (1774), the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights (1776), and Lee’s Resolutions (calling for a 
Declaration of Independence) (1776). 
 
 
 313. Id. at 59–60 (emphasis added). 
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The Founders wove together themes of happiness as a private right and 
a public duty in their individual writings, as well. For example, Benjamin 
Franklin stated “[t]he desire of happiness in general is so natural to us that 
all the world are in pursuit of it” and although men may attempt to achieve 
happiness in different ways, the reality is that “[i]t is impossible ever to 
enjoy ourselves rightly if our conduct be not such as to preserve the 
harmony and order of our faculties and the original frame and constitution 
of our minds; all true happiness, as all that is truly beautiful, can only 
result from order.”314 Therefore, according to Franklin, if we pursue 
happiness through passion instead of reason, we achieve only an “inferior” 
and “imperfect” happiness, because “[t]here is no happiness then but in a 
virtuous and self-approving conduct.”315 Indeed, Franklin argued “the 
Science of Virtue is of more worth, and of more consequence to [man’s] 
Happiness than all the rest [of the sciences] put together.”316 Furthermore, 
Franklin stated, “I believe [God] is pleased and delights in the Happiness 
of those he has created; and since without Virtue Man can have no 
Happiness in this World, I firmly believe he delights to see me Virtuous, 
because he is pleas’d when he sees me Happy.”317  
Franklin tied this private happiness to public happiness when he wrote 
that the improvement of “private character” would assist the development 
of “all happiness both public and domestic” and that “most necessary to 
increase the Happiness of a Country . . . is the promoting of Knowledge 
and Virtue.”318 As he said in a Sept 17, 1787 speech before the 
Constitutional Convention: “Much of the Strength and Efficiencey [sic] of 
any Government in procuring and securing Happiness to the People 
depends on Opinion, on the general Opinion of the Goodness of that 
Government as well as of the Wisdom and Integrity of its Governors.”319 
John Adams held similar views, affirming in a 1763 letter to the Boston 
Gazette, that “truth and virtue, as the means of present and future 
 
 
 314. Benjamin Franklin, II THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 7–8 (John Bigelow ed., 1904), 
available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2454/231483 (last visited May 4, 2015).  
 315. FRANKLIN, supra note 314, at 8, 10. 
 316. Benjamin Franklin, A Man of Sense, in 2 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (Leonard 
Labaree ed., 1960) (1735), available at http://franklinpapers.org/franklin//framedVolumes.jsp (last 
visited May 4, 2015) [hereinafter FRANKLIN PAPERS]. 
 317. Benjamin Franklin, Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion, in 1 FRANKLIN PAPERS (Nov. 20, 
1728), supra note 316  
 318. Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography, Part 7, in FRANKLIN PAPERS (1771), supra note 316; 
Joseph Breintnall, Library Company to John Penn in FRANKLIN PAPERS (May 31, 1735), supra note 
316. 
 319. Benjamin Franklin, Speech in the Convention on the Constitution (unpublished) (Sept. 17, 
1787), in FRANKLIN PAPERS, supra note 316.  
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happiness, are confessed to be the only objects that deserve to be pursued 
. . . .”320 Adams claimed to study “magistracy and legislation . . . as means 
and instruments of human happiness,” concluding that, “. . . the liberty, the 
unalienable, indefeasible rights of men, the honor and dignity of human 
nature, the grandeur and glory of the public, and the universal happiness of 
individuals, was never so skilfully [sic] and successfully consulted, as in 
that most excellent monument of human art, the common law of 
England.”321 In a 1775 letter to his wife, Adams argued for education in 
the public virtues of “Benevolence, Charity, Capacity and Industry,” 
stating that the same virtues that made for a happy private life would make 
for a happy public life, as well.
322
  
In his March 4, 1797 Inaugural Address in the City of Philadelphia, 
Adams continued these themes, arguing that the propagation of 
“knowledge, virtue, and religion among all classes of the people” would 
further “not only . . . the happiness of life in all its stages and classes, and 
of society in all its forms, but [also] as the only means of preserving our 
Constitution . . . .”323 Adams emphasized the connection between the 
frame of government and the happiness of the people in his Fourth Annual 
Message on November 22, 1800, proclaiming, “[m]ay this territory be the 
residence of virtue and happiness[,]” before going on to encourage the 
House of Representatives to continue in their “labors to promote the 
general happiness.”324 
Jefferson voiced similar connections between virtue and happiness, and 
between private and public happiness in his own writings. In his Summary 
View of the Rights of British America, Jefferson stated that the colonists 
came to America and created “new societies, under such laws and 
regulations as to them shall seem most likely to promote public 
 
 
 320. 1 John Adams, “U” to the Boston Gazette (Aug. 29, 1763), in PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 76–
81 (Robert Taylor ed., 1977), available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-01-02-
0045-0007 (last visited May 4, 2015) [hereinafter THE ADAMS PAPERS]. 
 321. 1 John Adams, “U” to the Boston Gazette (Sept. 5, 1763), in PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 76-81 
(Robert Taylor ed., 1977), available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-01-02-0045-
0009 (last visited May 4, 2015). 
 322. John Adams, Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Oct. 29, 1775), ADAMS FAMILY 
PAPERS: AN ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L1775102 
9ja&bc=% 2Fdigitaladams%2Farchive%2Fbrow se%2Fletters_1774_1777.php (last visited May 4, 
2015). 
 323. John Adams, Inaugural Address in the City of Philadelphia (Mar. 4, 1797), available at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/925/925-h/925-h.htm#link2H_4_0003 (last visited May 4, 2015).  
 324. John Adams, Letter from John Adams to United States Congress (Nov. 22, 1800), in THE 
ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 320, available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-
02-4691 (last visited May 4, 2015).  
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happiness.”325 Jefferson revisited themes of private and public happiness 
throughout his Presidential Inaugural Addresses and Annual Messages to 
Congress,
326
 discussing the “true principles” of the Constitution and urging 
a combination of “action” and “sentiment” that would be “auspicious to 
[the people’s] happiness and safety”327 and emphasizing the legislature’s 
role in “lay[ing] the foundations of public happiness in wholesome laws 
. . . .”328 
Jefferson evidenced similar themes in his private writings. In 1770, he 
stated that it was the “indispensable duty of every virtuous member of 
society to prevent the ruin, and promote the happiness, of his country, by 
every lawful means . . . .”329 Jefferson wrote to John Adams in 1794, 
closing with “wishes of every degree of happiness to you both public and 
private . . .”330 and in 1796 sending to Adams a wish “that your 
administration may be filled with glory and happiness to yourself and 
advantage to us . . . .”331 In his Notes on the Doctrine of Epicurus, 
Jefferson writes that happiness is the aim of life, and virtue the foundation 
of happiness,
332
 a theme he articulated in an 1814 letter to philosopher and 
 
 
 325. Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, in THE JEFFERSON 
PAPERS, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/jeffsumm.asp (last visited May 4, 2015). 
 326. See also Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THE JEFFERSON 
PAPERS, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp (last visited May 4, 2015); 
Thomas Jefferson, Third Annual Message to Congress (Oct. 17, 1803), in THE JEFFERSON PAPERS, 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes3.asp (last visited May 4, 2015); and 
Thomas Jefferson, Eighth Annual Message to Congress (Nov. 8, 1808), in THE JEFFERSON PAPERS, 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes8.asp (last visited May 4, 2015).  
 327. Thomas Jefferson, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 15, 1802), in THE JEFFERSON 
PAPERS, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes2.asp (last visited May 4, 2015). 
 328. Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), in THE JEFFERSON PAPERS, 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffinau2.asp (last visited May 4, 2015). 
 329. Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Nonimportation Resolutions (June 22, 1770), in THE JEFFERSON 
PAPERS, available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0032 (last visited 
May 4, 2015). 
 330. Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Apr. 25, 1794), in THE 
JEFFERSON PAPERS, available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-28-02-0055 (last 
visited May 4, 2015). 
 331. Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson To John Adams (Dec. 28, 1796), in THE 
JEFFERSON PAPERS, available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-29-02-0190-
0002 (last visited May 4, 2015). 
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scientist Jose Correa da Serra, stating that it was “the order of nature to be 
that individual happiness shall be inseparable from the practice of virtue 
. . . .”333  
CONCLUSION: THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The preceding discussion shows that, far from being a “glittering 
generality” or a direct substitution for property, the pursuit of happiness is 
a phrase that had a distinct meaning to those who included that phrase in 
two of the eighteenth-century’s most influential legal documents: William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769) and the 
Declaration of Independence (1776). That distinct meaning included a 
belief in first principles by which the created world is governed, the idea 
that these first principles were discoverable by man, and the belief that to 
pursue a life lived in accordance with those principles was to pursue a life 
of virtue, with the end result of happiness, best defined in the Greek sense 
of eudaimonia or human flourishing. The pursuit of happiness is a phrase 
full of substance from Blackstone (and before) to the Founders (and 
beyond). It was part of an English and Scottish Enlightenment 
understanding of epistemology and jurisprudence.
334
 It found its way into 
eighteenth-century English sermons and colonial era speeches and 
writings on political tyranny. It had meaning to those who wrote and spoke 
the phrase in eighteenth-century English and American legal contexts, and 
it had meaning to its listeners. 
The first recorded reference to the pursuit of happiness in a U.S. 
Supreme Court case does not occur until 1823,
335
 but what is perhaps more 
interesting than this articulation of the phrase nearly 50 years after the 
signing of the Declaration is the Court’s articulation of first principles of 
law in earlier decisions. For example, in Fletcher v. Peck (1795), the U.S. 
 
 
 333. Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jose Correa da Serra (Apr. 19, 1814), in 
THE JEFFERSON PAPERS, available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-07-02-
0216. 
 334. Indeed, in a discussion of innate principles, Locke himself defines the pursuit of happiness in 
terms that are strikingly consistent with Blackstone’s definition. “For, God having, by an inseparable 
connexion [sic], joined virtue and public happiness together, and made the practice thereof necessary 
to the preservation of society, and visibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do; it is 
no wonder that every one should not only allow, but recommend and magnify those rules to others, 
from whose observance of them he is sure to reap advantage to himself[.]” LOCKE, AN ESSAY 
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 71, at Book 1, Chapter 3, Section 6 (1691). If the 
Founders had intended to include in the Declaration a phrase that could serve as a substantive or non-
substantive substitution for Locke’s unalienable right to property, the pursuit of happiness would have 
been an awfully odd phrase for them to have selected. 
 335. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 63 (1823).  
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Supreme Court based its decision on “certain great principles of justice, 
whose authority is universally acknowledged” with the concurring opinion 
citing to “general principle . . . the reason and nature of things.”336 In 
Terrett v. Taylor (1815), the court based its holding on “the principles of 
natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free government.”337 A 
full understanding of the meaning of the pursuit of happiness in its 
historical context suggests that these phrases, too, are not glittering 
generalities, but, instead, were intended to be articulations of the 
substantive legal principles that Blackstone and the Founders believed the 
pursuit of happiness could enable man to find. 
If the phrase “pursuit of happiness” seems empty, or too general, to us 
today, it is not because we, as a people, have lost the desire to pursue that 
which makes us happy, but because the most common contemporary 
understanding of the word “happy” aligns today with what the eighteenth-
century philosophers would have called a “fleeting and temporal” 
happiness versus a “real and substantial” happiness. The first is a 
happiness rooted in disposition, circumstance, and temperament; it is a 
temporary feeling of psychological pleasure. The second is happiness as 
eudaimonia—well-being or human flourishing. It includes a sense of 
psychological pleasure or “feeling good” but does so in a “real” or 
“substantial” sense. It is “real” in that it is genuine and true. It is 
substantial in that it pertains to the substance or essence of what it means 
to be fully human.
338
  
The pursuit of happiness in this sense perhaps might include, as 
previous scholars have argued, the ownership of property, either in John 
Locke’s narrower view of property as that which results from the 
application of man’s labor or his broader view of property as consisting of 
man’s life, liberty, and estate. It could include the Founders’ 
understanding of property ownership as a precondition for the freeing of 
man’s will, and therefore his ability to choose a life of virtue.339 The 
pursuit of happiness could include the fulfillment to be found in private 
family life or the duty to live out a life of virtue in the public realm. And 
the end result of such a pursuit could be, in the words of Black’s Law 
Dictionary, “the highest enjoyment, [the] increase [of] one’s prosperity, or 
 
 
 336. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUMES III–IV THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 
1815–35, 604–05 (1988) (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 133, 143 (1795)).  
 337. WHITE, supra note 336, at 608–09 (citing Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43, 52 (1815)). 
 338. “Substance” is defined as “the essential part.” JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra note 20. 
 339. WHITE, supra note 336, at 2. 
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. . . the development of one’s faculties.”340 But not one of these elements 
fully defines happiness or its pursuit in an eighteenth-century legal 
context; they are, instead, only pieces of the larger whole.  
To recapture the eighteenth-century legal meaning of the phrase 
“pursuit of happiness” is to limit the definition of the pursuit of happiness 
to one great thing—the pursuit of eudaimonia, or human flourishing. It is 
to evoke a private right to pursue a life lived in accordance with the laws 
of nature and a public duty to govern in harmony with those laws. As 
contained in Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Declaration of 
Independence, the pursuit of happiness is not a legal guarantee that one 
will obtain happiness, even when happiness is defined within its 
eighteenth-century context. It is instead, an articulation of the idea that as 
humans we were created to live, at liberty, with the unalienable right to 
engage in the pursuit. 
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/6
